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98 N.C. L. REV. 438 (2020)

School of Surveillance: The Students’ Rights Implications of Artificial
Intelligence as K-12 Public School Security *
Concerns about school safety dominate the nation as school shootings leave parents,
children, and school officials in constant fear. In response to the violence, some schools
are acquiring advanced artificial intelligence surveillance technology, including facial
recognition and geolocation tracking devices, to strengthen security. The companies
behind these technologies claim they will improve school safety. However, there is little
indication that they are effective or accurate. Moreover, there is even less information
regarding the implications to student privacy and the potential negative impact on the
educational environment. Studies prove facial recognition technologies are biased
against people of color, which could have devastating effects on students who are already
at risk of being pushed out of school through the school-to-prison pipeline. This Comment
focuses on public K-12 schools. It includes a review of the efficacy and accuracy of the
technologies, analysis of relevant privacy laws, and assessment of the impact on the
academic environment. It concludes that the many risks associated with introducing
artificial intelligence surveillance technologies into schools must be evaluated through
interdisciplinary conversation and should be explored prior to implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
The publicity around gun violence in schools has increased since the late
1990s, marked by horrific examples of mass shootings in the halls of K-12
schools and on college campuses. 1 While the exact number of school shootings
is disputed, 2 the impact of school violence is undeniable. A national poll
1. See, e.g., James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-atconnecticut-elementary-school.html [https://perma.cc/VZ27-VB7R (dark archive)]; Elizabeth Chuck,
Alex Johnson & Corky Siemaszko, 17 Killed in Mass Shooting at High School in Parkland, Florida, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/police-respond-shooting-parklandflorida-high-school-n848101 [https://perma.cc/L7DJ-AVF8]; Christine Hauser & Anahad O’Connor,
Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/
16/us/16cnd-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/442T-D34Q (dark archive)]; Brittney Martin et al.,
‘Overwhelming Grief’: 8 Students, 2 Teachers Killed in Texas High School Shooting, WASH. POST (May 20,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/05/19/ten-killed-in-texas-highschool-shooting-were-mostly-students-police-say-suspect-confessed [https://perma.cc/L4JD-YVBG
(dark archive)]; Mark Obmascik, Columbine High School Shooting Leaves 15 Dead, 28 Hurt, DENVER
POST (Apr. 21, 1999), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/shot0420a.htm [https://perma.cc/K7KJTE36].
2. As a result of differing definitions and terminology used in data collection and analysis, the
exact number of school shootings in the United States is unclear. See Saeed Ahmed & Christina Walker,
There Has Been, on Average, 1 School Shooting Every Week This Year, CNN (May 25, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/us/school-shootings-2018-list-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/
JWS3-EWQB] (including accidental discharge of a firearm). But see Chris Wilson, This Chart Shows
the Number of School Shooting Victims Since Sandy Hook, TIME (Feb. 22, 2018),
http://time.com/5168272/how-many-school-shootings/
[https://perma.cc/4VHE-NSUZ
(dark
archive)] (excluding accidental discharge of a firearm). The United States Department of Education’s
2015–16 Civil Rights Data Collection report revealed a number of schools had incidents of gun
violence. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–16 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA
COLLECTION SCHOOL CLIMATE AND SAFETY 2 (May 2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
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conducted in 2018 revealed that one-third of parents now fear for their
children’s physical safety in school, a statistic that reflects a twenty-two percent
increase since 2013. 3 Another survey reported that “[t]wenty percent of parents
say their child has expressed concern to them about feeling unsafe at their
school.” 4 The March For Our Lives movement, 5 started by survivors of the
2018 mass shooting 6 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, 7 saw an
estimated 800,000 people turn out for its rally in Washington, D.C., to advocate
for gun violence prevention legislation. 8 In 2018 alone, state legislatures
considered more than 300 school safety bills and signed over fifty into law. 9
Student safety has also gained considerable traction as a priority within
the federal government. Citing the Marjory Stoneman Douglas shooting as an
list/ocr/docs/school-climate-and-safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5JL-QBL3] (“Nearly 230 schools (0.2
percent of all schools) reported at least 1 incident involving a school-related shooting . . . .”). However,
the accuracy of the study was called into dispute after schools denied that many of the incidents had
occurred and complaints regarding confusing wording in the questionnaire came to light. See Anya
Kamenetz, Alexis Arnold & Emily Cardinali, The School Shootings That Weren’t, NPR (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/08/27/640323347/the-school-shootings-that-werent
[https://perma.cc/V64L-D2DP] (“NPR reached out to every one of those schools repeatedly over the
course of three months and found that more than two-thirds of these reported incidents never
happened.”).
3. PHI DELTA KAPPAN, THE 50TH ANNUAL PDK POLL OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS K9 (2018), http://pdkpoll.org/assets/downloads/pdkpoll50_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KP8Y-XD5U]; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, More Parents, Children Fearful for Safety at
School, GALLUP (Aug. 24, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/241625/parents-children-fearful-safetyschool.aspx [https://perma.cc/49FJ-6ZVU] (reporting thirty-five percent of parents “fear for their
child’s safety at school”).
4. Jones, supra note 3.
5. MARCH FOR OUR LIVES, https://marchforourlives.com [https://perma.cc/8HJ5-XZ69].
6. The phrase “mass shooting” is not uniformly defined. Emily Alfin Johnson, What Is a Mass
Shooting? Why We Struggle To Agree on How Many There Were This Year, WAMU (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/08/04/what-is-a-mass-shooting-why-we-struggle-to-agree-on-how-manythere-were-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/MRG8-5E52]; Jason Puckett & David Tregde, VERIFY:
Claims of Over 250 ‘Mass Shootings’ in 2019 Need Context; Could Be Closer to 30, WUSA9 (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/verify/verify-claims-of-over-250-mass-shootings-in-2019-needcontext-could-be-closer-to-30/507-17aae119-8dd5-40f6-b73a-e083324ed795 [https://perma.cc/RRV4S67K]. For the purposes of this Comment, mass shooting refers to shooting incidents in which four or
more people are injured or killed by a gun. See Johnson, supra; Puckett & Tregde, supra.
7. Chuck et al., supra note 1.
8. Jessica Durando, March For Our Lives Could Be the Biggest Single-Day Protest in D.C.’s History,
USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/03/24/march-ourlives-could-become-biggest-single-day-protest-d-c-nations-history/455675002/
[https://perma.cc/3ZXQ-ZAZQ].
9. Alexis Arnold, Bills and Bulletproof Backpacks: Safety Measures for a New School Year, NPR (Aug.
16,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/636005341/bills-and-bulletproof-backpacks-safetymeasures-for-a-new-school-year [https://perma.cc/C7E7-BJR6]; see also Heidi Macdonald & Zeke
Perez, 50-State Comparison: K-12 School Safety, EDUC. COMMISSION STS. (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.ecs.org/50-state-comparison-k-12-school-safety/
[https://perma.cc/7LP3-PZE7]
(discussing state firearm policies for schools); State Education Policy Tracking, EDUC. COMMISSION
STS. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.ecs.org/state-education-policy-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/P94Q8Z4M].
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impetus, 10 President Trump created the U.S. Department of Education’s
Federal Commission on School Safety11 in March 2018 to study violence in
schools and provide recommendations for proactive measures at the federal,
state, and local levels to prevent school violence, mitigate outcomes of violent
actions, and facilitate efficient responses to violent situations. 12 The
recommendations incorporate “best practices for school building security,”
including the use of technologies like video surveillance and screening
systems. 13
In response to the fears of additional school violence and calls for enhanced
school security, schools have begun tightening security through the use of
emerging technologies. 14 While basic security cameras have been used as
monitoring devices in schools for years, some schools are looking to more
advanced technologies to gain a greater level of control over the campus
environment. 15 Recognizing the market opportunity, technology companies are
developing new devices they claim will prevent or reduce the likelihood of
school shootings. 16 These new devices, which include advanced cameras and
10. See FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COMMISSION ON SCHOOL SAFETY 5 (Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT],
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SWUDWL2].
11. The Federal Commission on School Safety was tasked with “providing meaningful and
actionable recommendations to keep students safe at school.” Federal Commission on School Safety, U.S.
DEP’T EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/school-safety [https://perma.cc/SC3E-KZGF]. After months of
listening sessions, field visits, and outreach to stakeholders, id., the Commission released its final report
in December 2018, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 10.
12. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 126–27 (specifically addressing gun violence and building
security improvements for prevention of violence).
13. Id. at 119, 122–23.
14. See, e.g., Kaitlyn DeHaven, Texas ISD Makes Major Security Upgrades Over the Summer,
CAMPUS SECURITY & LIFE SAFETY (Aug. 9, 2019), https://campuslifesecurity.com/articles/2019/
08/09/texas-isd-makes-major-security-upgrades-over-the-summer.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3YFRTZ47] (“Two apps will now be used as part of the security measures—the Anonymous Alerts app and
the Smart Button. . . . In terms of physical security, the district installed video intercoms at each school
entrance.”); Mark Keierleber, Inside the $3 Billion School Security Industry: Companies Marketed
Sophisticated Technology To ‘Harden’ Campuses, but Will It Make Us Safe?, 74 (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.the74million.org/article/inside-the-3-billion-school-security-industry-companiesmarket-sophisticated-technology-to-harden-campuses-but-will-it-make-us-safe/
[https://perma.cc/5JY6-HVBE] (“Schools have increasingly locked and monitored campus entrances
in recent years, though the rise in school security is most evident in the growth of video surveillance.”).
15. See Keierleber, supra note 14.
16. The media streaming company RealNetworks is offering its facial recognition software to over
100,000 school districts for free, with the goal of making schools safer. Eli Zimmerman, Company Offers
Free Facial Recognition Software To Boost School Security, EDTECH (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2018/08/company-offers-free-facial-recognition-softwareboost-school-security [https://perma.cc/4V9N-TMSD]; see also Press Release, SAFR, RealNetworks
Provides SAFR Facial Recognition Solution for Free to Every K-12 School in the U.S. and Canada
(July 17, 2018), https://safr.com/press-release/realnetworks-provides-safr-facial-recognition-solutionfor-free-to-every-k-12-school-in-the-u-s-and-canada/ [https://perma.cc/W9LZ-TA65] (“School safety
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body scanners,17 use biometrics and artificial intelligence (“AI”) to recognize
faces; detect weapons, gunshots, and other threats; and track individuals’
locations in schools. 18 For the purposes of addressing school security, the main
focuses of this Comment are facial recognition, ballistic detection, threat
assessment, and location tracking, which schools have begun introducing in
recent years. 19
Despite the purported promise of biometric and AI technologies to protect
students, these innovations present troubling students’ rights concerns. An
inherent tension exists between the desire to protect students from violence
through the installation of biometric and AI technologies and the rights
students—children—must sacrifice in service of that goal, namely their
fundamental right to privacy. 20 These technologies are intrusive; they involve
capturing images of children, recording fingerprints, scanning social media, and
tracking everything from movements to facial expressions. 21 This is a significant
amount of information to be recorded and associated with young people.

has become one of the top national issues in the United States in 2018. . . . We hope this will help make
schools safer.”); Austin Cushing, What Should Schools Consider Regarding Metal Detectors and X-Ray
Scanners As Security Measures?, ANCHORTEX CORP. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.anchortex.com/
company/blog/94-what-should-schools-consider-regarding-metal-detectors-and-x-ray-scanners-assecurity-measures [https://perma.cc/D85S-H8PA] (“The National Institute of Justice confirms in its
project, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, that walkthrough metal detectors work well at detecting most types of firearms and knives, and can be used as
part of a school environment.”).
17. See sources cited supra note 16.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I. For an analysis of the broader array of school surveillance technologies that
makes up the “surveillance state” in North Carolina, see Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding
Classroom: Surveillance in K-12 Public Schools, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1673 (2019).
20. The tension between security and privacy in the wake of deadly attacks is no new
phenomenon. After the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, office buildings and airports adopted
proactive approaches to security to meet the call for risk reduction. See, e.g., Roger Vincent, Office
Building Security Tightened After 9/11, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
sep/10/business/la-fi-911-highrise-security-20110910 [https://perma.cc/GA57-V9RN (dark archive)]
(explaining the increase in office building security in major cities); see also Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now:
Ways We Have Changed, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 14, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/911to-now-ways-we-have-changed [https://perma.cc/MH8B-BFVC] (citing the passage of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act two months after the attacks). These post-9/11 security protocols have
raised the contentious question of how to balance individual civil liberties with national security. See
Kathleen Hicks, What Will Americans Do About Their Fear of Terrorism?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/the-state-of-national-security-after911/496046/ [https://perma.cc/6D6Z-RCAW (dark archive)] (indicating, in addition, that “[c]urrent
debates over the best way to balance individual rights with security in the context of government
surveillance have antecedents in the treatment of anti-war and civil-rights figures during the 1960s and
1970s”); see also Sahil Chinoy, We Built an ‘Unbelievable’ (but Legal) Facial Recognition Machine, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/16/opinion/facial-recognitionnew-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/SE53-KS5B (dark archive)] (discussing facial recognition
technology in New York and the lack of state and federal regulation).
21. See infra Part I.
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Students may not understand the extent to which their personal information is
being collected and shared, and high-level surveillance may alter the nature of
the educational environment. While schools certainly need to prioritize student
safety, the degree to which new surveillance technologies compromise student
privacy is alarming.
The threat to student privacy is even more concerning given that these
technologies are in their infancy. There is little evidence that they are effective
or accurate, and there is even less information regarding the types of risks they
pose to students and how to mitigate them. 22 School districts are investing in
costly security systems and sharing student data with law enforcement and
security companies 23 all in the name of protecting students, but most of these
technologies have not been proven to stop school shootings. 24 Some critics have
challenged the accuracy of devices, such as facial recognition scanners,
particularly when it comes to identification of younger people—the main focus
in K-12 schools—and people of color, who already experience surveillance and
law enforcement intrusion at disproportionate rates. 25
22. See Stefanie Coyle & John A. Curr III, Facial Recognition Cameras Do Not Belong in Schools,
NYCLU (June 18, 2018), https://www.nyclu.org/en/news/facial-recognition-cameras-do-not-belongschools [https://perma.cc/BJZ7-ZJXU] (describing the “potential to turn every step a student takes into
evidence of a crime”); Sarah St. Vincent, Facial Recognition Technology in US Schools Threatens Rights,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 21, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/21/facial-recognitiontechnology-us-schools-threatens-rights [https://perma.cc/BJZ7-ZJXU] (explaining that facial
recognition technology in schools may harm children of color). Additionally, there are added
complexities for K-12 schools, as opposed to higher education institutions, because the vast majority of
students are minors.
23. See Sara Collins, Tyler Park & Amelia Vance, Ensuring School Safety While Also Protecting
Privacy, FUTURE PRIVACY F. (June 6, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/06/06/ensuring-school-safety-whilealso-protecting-privacy-fpf-testimony-before-the-federal-commission-on-school-safety/
[https://perma.cc/6VE8-BSKJ] (“Schools are using services such as social media monitoring, digital
video surveillance linked to law enforcement, and visitor management systems to help protect their
students.”); Ivan Moreno, AI-Powered Cameras Become New Tool Against Mass Shootings, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Aug.
30,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/eca5dcff514b49eb8edaaf301d0a3a3d
[https://perma.cc/7NMG-Q79J]. Lockport City School District in New York faced backlash from
parents and the New York Civil Liberties Union after investing $3.3 million in a facial recognition
system. See Thomas J. Prohaska, Lockport Schools Turn to State-of-the-Art Technology To Beef Up Security,
BUFFALO NEWS (May 20, 2018) [hereinafter Prohaska, Beef Up Security],
https://buffalonews.com/2018/05/20/lockport-schools-turn-to-state-of-the-art-technology-to-beef-upsecurity/ [https://perma.cc/5T6L-ZGV6 (dark archive)]; Thomas J. Prohaska, NYCLU Attacks Lockport
Schools’
Facial
Recognition
Security
Plan,
BUFFALO NEWS
(Sept.
3,
2018),
https://buffalonews.com/2018/09/03/nyclu-attacks-lockport-schools-facial-recognition-security-plan/
[https://perma.cc/5T6L-ZGV6 (dark archive)].
24. See Drew Harwell, Unproven Facial-Recognition Companies Target Schools, Promising an End to
Shootings, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
unproven-facial-recognition-companies-target-schools-promising-an-end-to-shootings/2018/06/07/
1e9e6d52-68db-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html [https://perma.cc/7DKL-5UJA (dark archive)].
25. See Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-says-aboutmodern-spying.html [https://perma.cc/DA3W-LNM8] (describing the National Security
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This Comment addresses key legal issues surrounding advanced security
technologies in public K-12 schools, including the impact on student privacy
rights under relevant laws. It also explores the effects these technologies have
on the educational environment. It argues that, in using AI surveillance
technology in schools, privacy must be balanced against security concerns; the
apparent issues with efficacy and accuracy of the technology should be
addressed before implementation; and Fourth Amendment case law, federal
student privacy legislation, and state laws need to be further developed, with
states leading the way, to ensure the protection of students’ rights. The scope
of the analysis is limited to public schools because these schools are subject to
more government control than private schools. 26
Part I presents background on AI technologies and an overview of the
technologies that are currently in use or are in development for school
surveillance. Part II addresses potential harms to students resulting from AI
surveillance in schools, including the implications of accuracy and efficacy issues
in AI algorithms. Part III delves into the application of relevant privacy laws,
specifically the Fourth Amendment, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (“FERPA”), and state laws, and demonstrates that the law has not
progressed to the point of effectively protecting students from AI surveillance.
In the end, this Comment argues that schools and governments have more work
to do to protect students from technological intrusions that undermine their
basic rights.
I. OVERVIEW OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
Gone are the days when school security simply meant a parent volunteer
at the front office, student IDs with outdated photos, or low-quality cameras
that produced grainy images from afar. Today’s surveillance options are in a
constant state of technological development, utilizing advanced methods that
resemble Orwell’s predictions. 27 This part begins with an overview of the
Association’s wiretapping of Martin Luther King Jr., surveillance of Japanese Americans during World
War II, and the monitoring of shops in majority-Muslim neighborhoods post-September 11, 2001).
26. See The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/fed/role.html [https://perma.cc/4C8V-RE69]; Stephanie Watson, How Public Schools Work,
HOW STUFF WORKS, https://people.howstuffworks.com/public-schools2.htm [https://perma.cc/
AM5P-MYVE]. In comparison to public schools, private schools are subject to less regulation. See
generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009) [hereinafter
STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS], https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/
regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FGW-R3UG] (illustrating the minimal regulatory
requirements for private schools).
27. See, e.g., Patrick Law Grp., LLC, When 2017 Becomes 1984: Facial Recognition Technologies—
Face a Growing Legal Landscape, JD SUPRA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/when2017-becomes-1984-facial-79060/ [https://perma.cc/H82U-C6JQ]. Despite some parallels between
Orwell’s predictions and current technology, most of the surveillance systems depicted in the classic
dystopian novel 1984 were far more advanced than what is being used in the United States today—as
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mechanics of biometric and AI technology. It then describes the specific types
of technologies in use for security in schools.
Biometric technology is “the automated technique of measuring a physical
characteristic or personal trait of an individual and comparing that characteristic
or trait to a database for purposes of recognizing that individual.” 28 Biometrics
may include “fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition, iris and retina scans, vein
structure, walking gait, and voice recognition.” 29 For example, when an
individual uses her thumbprint to unlock a cellphone, biometric technology is
used to recognize her specific thumbprint and unlock the phone.
Artificial intelligence takes biometric data to the next level. AI involves
machines or technologies completing tasks we typically think of as being
performed by humans. 30 There is no single accepted definition of AI, 31 but it
can be defined through categorizations of what it does or how it works: AI
engages in perception, natural language processing, logical reasoning, planning
and navigation, and knowledge representation. 32 While there are multiple
subfields of AI, “machine learning” has garnered a significant amount of
attention. 33 Machine learning is “a branch of artificial intelligence based on the
idea that systems can learn from data, identify patterns and make decisions with

far as we know. Rob Beschizza, Does the Technology of Orwell’s 1984 Really Exist?, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2008),
https://www.wired.com/2008/02/does-the-techno/ [https://perma.cc/WW9E-75V9 (dark archive)].
28. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—Drafting the
Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 99 (1997).
29. Robee Krishan & Reza Mostafavi, Biometric Technology: Security and Privacy Concerns, J.
INTERNET L., July 2018, at 19, 19.
30. Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Humans, PEW RES. CTR.
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/12/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-ofhumans/ [https://perma.cc/VN2F-Q8JB].
31. Matt Chessen, What Is Artificial Intelligence? Definitions for Policy-Makers and Non-Technical
Enthusiasts, MEDIUM (Apr. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/artificial-intelligence-policy-laws-andethics/what-is-artificial-intelligence-definitions-for-policy-makers-and-laymen-826fd3e9da3b
[https://perma.cc/LG29-S69H]. AI may be defined broadly as “a computerized system that exhibits
behavior that is commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or as “a system capable of rationally
solving complex problems or taking appropriate actions to achieve its goals in whatever real world
circumstances it encounters.” NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD9L
-6G56].
32. Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning: A Primer, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ
(June 10, 2016), https://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines/ [https://perma.cc/35ATFL9S].
33. See, e.g., Louis Columbus, State of AI and Machine Learning in 2019, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/09/08/state-of-ai-and-machine-learning-in2019/#7259621a1a8d [https://perma.cc/92VF-BTB2]; Ingrid Fidelli, Using Machine Learning To
Reconstruct Deteriorated Van Gogh Drawings, TECH XPLORE (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://techxplore.com/news/2019-09-machine-reconstruct-deteriorated-van-gogh.html
[https://perma.cc/9FWT-UBJJ].
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minimal human intervention.” 34 Through a system of algorithms, machine
learning “enables computers to learn from experience or examples.” 35
When AI is paired with biometrics, like facial recognition cameras or
fingerprint scanners, the technologies are able to more deeply assess the content
they are exploring. 36 Instead of simply capturing a photographic image or
copying a thumbprint, the system can run the information through a database,
look for a match, and then take action, like automatically opening a door. 37 In
the context of security, some companies are embedding their technologies with
machine learning and biometrics so that, for example, “the system is taught to
identify an object as a threat based on certain characteristics—such as the
signature [features] of a gun, knife or bomb.” 38 A system is trained by being fed
numerous images and asked to identify them until the system improves—or
“learns”—to the point where it identifies images at a high level of accuracy and
precision. 39
In schools, biometric and AI technologies cover a wide spectrum of
programs. The AI industry has seen a massive boom within the education
market, and the worldwide AI education market value is predicted to surpass
six billion dollars by 2024, 40 with classroom applications accounting for twenty
percent of that growth. 41 Much of the reason for this growth is the integration
34. Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/
analytics/machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/NVJ3-W8QQ].
35. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
&
DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIC
PLAN
5
(2016),
https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/
national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/F75U-43SY]. Deep learning, a more complex
branch of AI, has also made waves. See id. at 5 n.4 (describing deep learning as “a general family of
methods that use multi-layered neural networks”).
36. Naveen Joshi, Biometrics Is Smart, but AI Is Smarter. Here’s Why, ALLERIN (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.allerin.com/blog/biometrics-is-smart-but-ai-is-smarter-heres-why
[https://perma.cc/RN7S-LVKK] (“AI and biometrics can work together to develop effective and
reliable security models.”).
37. See, e.g., Stanley Goodner, Finger Scanners: What They Are and Why They Are Gaining in
Popularity, LIFEWIRE (June 24, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/understanding-finger-scanners4150464 [https://perma.cc/7R9X-L2MB]; Ronnie Wendt, Facial Recognition Technology Faces Scrutiny,
SECURITY SALES & INTEGRATION (July 30, 2019), https://www.securitysales.com/news/facialrecognition-tech-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/FK7H-HTUM].
38. Jennifer Kite-Powell, Making Facial Recognition Smarter with Artificial Intelligence, FORBES
(Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferhicks/2018/09/30/making-facial-recognitionsmarter-with-artificial-intelligence/#2611c94cc8f1 [https://perma.cc/GE69-XUQ6].
39. See Danny Sullivan, How Machine Learning Works, as Explained by Google, MARTECH TODAY
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://martechtoday.com/how-machine-learning-works-150366 [https://perma.cc/
UZQ4-DKXV]; What Is Machine Learning?, MATHWORKS, https://www.mathworks.com/discovery/
machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/6QB2-9UZ4].
40. Ankita Bhutani & Preeti Wadhwani, Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Education Market Size Worth
$6bn by 2024, GLOBAL MKT. INSIGHTS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.gminsights.com/pressrelease/
artificial-intelligence-ai-in-education-market [https://perma.cc/W3RP-SNDQ].
41. Michele Molnar, K-12 Artificial Intelligence Market Set To Explode in U.S. and Worldwide by
2024, EDWEEK MKT. BRIEF (July 10, 2018), https://marketbrief.edweek.org/marketplace-k-12/k-12-
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of AI systems for personalized learning, which enables students to receive
“immediate and personalized feedback and instructions . . . without the
intervention of a human tutor.” 42 Biometrics have been incorporated into the
classroom as well,43 and some schools even use biometrics to allow students to
pay for lunch with just a fingerprint. 44
Schools are also starting to incorporate AI and biometrics into surveillance
programs. One popular new area of school surveillance technology is location
tracking. For instance, the program “e-hallpass” is a modern, electronic hall pass
that “continuously logs and monitors student time in the halls” and claims to
“improv[e] school security and emergency management while reducing
classroom disruptions by as much as 50%.”45 A similar program, “iClicker Reef,”
tracks attendance through a geolocation feature. 46 Using geolocation, 47 these
artificial-intelligence-market-set-explode-u-s-worldwide-2024/ [https://perma.cc/6HBQ-JCEF]; see
Karen Hao, China Has Started a Grand Experiment in AI Education. It Could Reshape How the World
Learns., MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614057/chinasquirrel-has-started-a-grand-experiment-in-ai-education-it-could-reshape-how-the/
[https://perma.cc/4XB4-TBA9 (dark archive)] (describing the development and efficacy of an AI
learning center in China).
42. Artificial Intelligence in Education Market To Hit $6bn by 2024, GLOBAL MKT. INSIGHTS (June
6,
2018),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/06/06/1517441/0/en/ArtificialIntelligence-in-Education-Market-to-hit-6bn-by-2024-Global-Market-Insights-Inc.html
[https://perma.cc/C99D-YETS].
43. E.g., Stephanie Babych, Virtual Reality Project at Lethbridge College Could Change the Way Justice
Studies Taught, CALGARY HERALD (Aug. 31, 2019), https://calgaryherald.com/news/localnews/virtual-reality-project-at-lethbridge-college-could-change-the-way-justice-studies-taught
[https://perma.cc/LW5M-HCGM] (describing a program that simulates scenarios police officers may
encounter and uses biometrics to test the efficacy of the training); Jen A. Miller, Biometrics in Schools
To Yield Security Benefits and Privacy Concerns, EDTECH MAG. (May 7, 2019),
https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2019/05/biometrics-schools-yield-security-benefits-andprivacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/43XZ-D23B] (“Biometric technology is already part of the K-12
ecosystem, where administrators are using iris scans and ‘facial fingerprints’ to grant access to buildings
and computer labs, track attendance, manage lunch payments, loan library materials and ensure
students get on the right buses.”); Mae Rice, 13 EdTech Applications that Are Transforming Teaching and
Learning, BUILT IN (June 22, 2019), https://builtin.com/edtech/technology-in-classroom-applications
[https://perma.cc/J265-VLXM] (describing an online test proctoring system which confirms testtakers’ identities through fingerprints and voice biometrics).
44. Biometrics Allows Students To Purchase with Fingerprint, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 17, 2007),
https://www.govtech.com/health/Biometrics-Allows-Students-to-Purchase-with.html
[https://perma.cc/E8BS-6QJH].
45. E-Hallpass, EDUSPIRE SOLUTIONS, https://www.eduspiresolutions.org/what-is-e-hallpass/
[https://perma.cc/7BBP-TY6L].
46. David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, How Students Learned To Stop Worrying—and Love Being Spied
On, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-StudentsLearned-to-Stop/244596 [https://perma.cc/XZW2-YKY8 (dark archive)].
47. Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, ITWORLD (Mar.
31, 2010), https://www.itworld.com/article/2756095/networking-hardware/geolocation-101--how-itworks--the-apps--and-your-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/AMB3-8VLK] (“Typically, geolocation
apps do two things: They report your location to other users, and they associate real-world locations
(such as restaurants and events) to your location.”).
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location systems have the ability to identify when a student is in class, log
attendance for the teacher, and track where students are in school. 48
Facial recognition is another growing category of biometric and AI
technology that schools are beginning to use. For example, one private high
school implemented a facial recognition49 camera program that automatically
unlocks doors upon recognition of individuals—staff, students, and
volunteers—whose photographs have been uploaded into the system database.50
The school can also upload images of “key undesirables,” such as sex offenders
or disgruntled employees, and the system will notify administrators if those
individuals are seen by the cameras. 51
Another type of facial recognition program, called “affect recognition,”
uses biometric analysis to scan individuals’ faces and identify emotions. 52 For
instance, an Australian university is currently testing a product called the
“Biometric Mirror,” which reads faces and ranks them according to fourteen
characteristics, including gender, age, ethnicity, attractiveness, “weirdness,” and
emotional stability. 53 Schools in China have implemented a similar technology
to analyze students’ facial expressions, including expressions like “neutral,
happy, sad, disappointed, angry, scared and surprised.” 54 The main goal of this
48. Rosen & Santesso, supra note 46. Some schools are extending their monitoring programs off
campus by scanning students’ social media accounts for potential threats. See Aleshia Howell, Opinion,
Surveillance Tech Compromises Trust, Safety in Schools, SAVANNAH NOW (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.savannahnow.com/opinion/20190919/aleshia-howell-column-surveillance-techcompromises-trust-safety-in-schools [https://perma.cc/X4XZ-MZ3R].
49. See Facial Recognition, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32071/facialrecognition [https://perma.cc/AMB3-8VLK] (“Facial recognition is a biometric software application
capable of uniquely identifying or verifying a person by comparing and analyzing patterns based on
the person’s facial contours.”).
50. Peter B. Counter, Facial Recognition Deployed at St. Louis High School, FIND BIOMETRICS
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://findbiometrics.com/facial-recognition-deployed-at-st-louis-high-school-23094/
[https://perma.cc/G9UM-FLLN]. Although the school in this case is a private school, this Comment
does not address private schools beyond this example because they are not subject to the same laws as
public schools. STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 26 (providing descriptions of
each state’s requirements for private schools); How Are the Local, State and Federal Governments Involved
in Education? Is This Involvement Just?, CTR. FOR PUB. JUST., https://www.cpjustice.org/public/
page/content/cie_faq_levels_of_government [https://perma.cc/EB7K-A378] (“Independent schools,
which are established by associations, parents or individuals, operate independent of direct government
control.”).
51. Counter, supra note 50.
52. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 4 (Dec. 2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EAJ-AALT]
(“Affect
recognition is a subclass of facial recognition that claims to detect things such as personality, inner
feelings, mental health, and ‘worker engagement’ based on images or video of faces.”).
53. Jo Lauder, Mirror, Mirror: How AI Is Using Facial Recognition To Decipher Your Personality, ABC
AUSTL. (July 23, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/how-ai-is-using-facialrecognition-to-decipher-your-personality/10025634 [https://perma.cc/9VGY-5L5X].
54. Neil Connor, Chinese School Uses Facial Recognition To Monitor Student Attention in Class,
TELEGRAPH (May 17, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/17/chinese-school-usesfacial-recognition-monitor-student-attention/ [https://perma.cc/TM3G-4RHP (dark archive)].
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so-called “smart eye” is to alert teachers when students are distracted in class.55
However, the identification of changes in mood may also assist educators with
identifying students experiencing mental health crises, which could help flag
potential threats. 56
The use of technology to analyze student behavior extends beyond the
physical classroom. Some schools are already monitoring their students online,
using Safety Management Platforms as threat assessment measures to scan
school computers for indicators of violence by analyzing the words students
type. 57 Threat assessment programs aim to “evaluate the risk posed by a student
or another person, typically as a response to an actual or perceived threat or
concerning behavior.” 58
A final type of surveillance technology receiving significant attention is
ballistic detection. For example, one company’s “gunshot defense system” uses
artificial intelligence to detect gunshots, alert law enforcement, and engage with
the shooter by “delivering intense, non-lethal sound waves and light beams that
virtually stops an attacker on the spot, which also creates a diversion to assist
students and faculty with additional time to run and hide or escape.” 59 Cameras
around the building track the shooter’s location and deliver updates to law
enforcement while the system uses AI to direct victims to the safest exits. 60 The
program’s developer markets the technology with a video stating that “[t]he
majority of the deaths and casualties [in a mass shooting] happen within the
first 5 minutes or 300 seconds,” 61 making it imperative to identify and stop a
shooter quickly. This type of technology is extremely appealing as it acts as a
first line of defense and assists responding law enforcement officers. Other

55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Randy Rieland, Can Artificial Intelligence Help Stop School Shootings?, SMITHSONIAN
(June 22, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/can-artificial-intelligence-help-stopschool-shootings-180969288/ [https://perma.cc/7VRZ-2T6Y] (describing the use of machine learning
to analyze student language and behavior and help counselors with risk assessment).
57. Simone Stolzoff, Schools Are Using AI To Track What Students Write on Their Computers,
QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/1318758/schools-are-using-ai-to-track-what-students-writeon-their-computers/ [https://perma.cc/X9B2-LEHB].
58. Threat Assessment, OFF. SUPERINTENDENT PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.k12.wa.us/
student-success/health-safety/school-safety-center/z-index/threat-assessment
[https://perma.cc/
VF6E-CTL5]; see also Threat Assessment for School Administrators & Crisis Teams, NAT’L ASS’N SCH.
PSYCHOLOGISTS, https://www.nasponline.org/resources-and-publications/resources-and-podcasts/
school-climate-safety-and-crisis/systems-level-prevention/threat-assessment-at-school/threatassessment-for-school-administrators-and-crisis-teams [https://perma.cc/KVV7-GMNY] (“The goals
of threat assessment are to keep schools safe and to help potential offenders overcome the underlying
sources of their anger, hopelessness, or despair.”).
59. 300
Seconds
Video—School
Security
Solutions,
SECURITY
ORACLE,
https://www.thesecurityoracle.com/system-products/school-security-solution
[https://perma.cc/4R8G-5LW9].
60. Id.
61. Id.
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companies that use ballistic detection, but different methods of response, have
also entered the K-12 market. 62
Although the technology may sound positive from a security standpoint,
these technologies are intrusive and create an environment where students are
tracked, monitored, and watched. Many of these programs involve constant
monitoring of children, and some collect personally identifying data, including
fingerprints and face images. As will be discussed in Parts II and III, there are
a number of potential adverse consequences of these technologies: students may
be less likely to speak openly in class, risks of false data matches may lead to
wrongful disciplinary actions, and the technologies encroach on student privacy
rights.
II. EFFICACY AND ACCURACY PROBLEMS WITH AI SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGIES
The use of AI surveillance technologies in schools has the potential to alter
the academic environment, in large part because the unknown inner workings
of the technologies result in problems with accuracy and efficacy. This part
addresses the impact of surveillance on students’ freedom in the educational
setting, which is compounded by the lack of transparency of AI technology
developers. The lack of transparency makes it difficult to fully predict the extent
of potential issues with the technologies, such as bias in the algorithms that
could result in harm to students and their parents. Instead of providing a safer
environment, these developments come at the expense of safety, especially
given that the efficacy of the technologies in preventing school violence has not
been proven.
A.

Impact on the Academic Environment

One example of the impact new surveillance technologies may have on
students comes in the classroom setting. Students who know they are being
monitored may not express controversial views, thus suppressing the quality of
the academic environment. Students may also avoid sharing personal details out
of fear of disciplinary response by their school. While companies claim their
surveillance programs are effective in preventing violence, they may also
normalize a surveillance state or “have a chilling effect on students’ freedom of
expression.” 63
62. See,
e.g.,
EAGL
Gunshot
Detection
&
Lockdown
System,
EAGL,
https://www.eagltechnology.com/eagl-gunshot-detection-lockdown-system/
[https://perma.cc/DY3W-MYF9]; Firefly & Dragonfly, EAGL, https://www.eagltechnology.com/
firefly-dragonfly/
[https://perma.cc/EZ4M-YBLQ];
LightAway,
VS
ENERGY,
https://www.vsenergy.us/lightaway-dynamic-lighting-wayfinding-372034.html
[https://perma.cc/BY77-EBLN].
63. Stolzoff, supra note 57.
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In the higher education setting, there is some evidence that students are
willing to withstand surveillance in exchange for efficiency. 64 This is perhaps
an even stronger example of the negative impact surveillance at an early age can
create. As students of younger generations have little choice in whether to give
up information to technology at a young age in K-12 schools, it is not surprising
that as they enter adulthood they will think less of the consequences and more
of the benefits.
B.

Lack of Transparency and Understanding

Beyond the impact on the academic environment, the new technology also
lacks transparency. Engineers may use AI to train a system to accurately
identify, for example, a picture of a turtle, but even the engineers may not know
how the system reaches its conclusion because the technology is so complex.
This “black box”—“the idea that we can understand what goes in and what
comes out, but don’t understand what goes on inside”—dramatically reduces
transparency. 65 While it may not be as concerning in a low-stakes situation that
lends itself to easy independent verifiability (like the turtle identification
example), misidentification, privacy intrusion, and harms to the educational
environment are risks of black box AI that will become more evident should
humans rely on machines for critical decisionmaking that impacts people’s lives
and abilities to achieve an education. 66 Further, AI involves proprietary
technologies, meaning companies can protect the inner workings of the
machines as intellectual property. 67 This allows companies to maintain secrecy
around the programs, so even if the engineers do know how a program is
reaching a conclusion, the company does not have to reveal that information.
The extent to which information is available regarding the inner workings of AI

64. Rosen & Santesso, supra note 46.
65. Tim Sandle, Crypto, AI and Machine Learning To Shape Enterprises, DIGITAL J. (Jan. 9, 2019),
http://www.digitaljournal.com/print/article/540595 [https://perma.cc/7KRD-HENR].
66. Some courts have begun using AI for recidivist risk assessment without a full understanding
of which factors the machines consider, thus raising due process concerns. See Noel L. Hillman, The
Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, JUDGES’ J. 36, 36–38 (2019); Katherine
Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed To Protect
Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75, 75, 104 (2016); Ed Yong, A Popular
Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes than Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/550646/
[https://perma.cc/3Q3Y-2ZV2 (dark archive)]. Similar models employed for credit scoring have
received criticism for efficacy problems. See Rachel O’Dwyer, Algorithms Are Making the Same Mistakes
Assessing Credit Scores that Humans Did a Century Ago, QUARTZ (May 14, 2018),
https://qz.com/1276781/algorithms-are-making-the-same-mistakes-assessing-credit-scores-thathumans-did-a-century-ago/ [https://perma.cc/8NSQ-9VXU].
67. See Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, A.B.A. (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201819/january-february/artificial-intelligence-trade-secrets-webinar [https://perma.cc/8YL5-MXGX].
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technologies thus heavily relies on companies’ willingness to voluntarily share
data, which many companies are hesitant to do. 68
C.

Efficacy of AI Surveillance To Prevent or Stop School Shootings

The lofty promises of AI surveillance companies remain unverified; it is
not yet certain that these technologies are effective in preventing school
shootings. For example, while facial recognition companies are marketing their
products as resources to stop prohibited people from entering campus, most
school shootings have been committed by students who were permitted to be
on campus. 69 Thus, while the technology may work well in a vacuum, 70 the
application to the types of shootings that occur at K-12 schools lacks indications
of efficacy. 71
So far, AI has not been proven to be foolproof in even its most basic
applications, showing that ill-intentioned people could circumvent AI
surveillance technologies in order to access schools. In fact, AI is even capable
of tricking AI. 72 In test settings, biometric security systems have been
threatened by AI manipulation. 73 In one study, researchers used neural
networks to create fake fingerprints in an attempt to fool fingerprint-scanning
systems—and it worked. 74 When the fakes tricked the system, it allowed the
researchers to refine their technology to create even more realistic and effective
fake prints. 75

68. The National Institute for Standards and Technology offers evaluations of facial recognition
programs, but the program is voluntary and there is no oversight or enforcement mechanism. Christina
Couch, Ghosts in the Machine, PBS: NOVA (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/aibias/ [https://perma.cc/4CU8-P8W5].
69. Harwell, supra note 24. Since 1970, there have been 1300 school shootings. The K-12 Shooting
Statistics Everyone Should Know (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/k-12school-shooting-statistics-everyone-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/8NST-5ER6]. Of those, 691 were
committed by a current student, while fifty-eight were committed by former students. Id.
70. The less risk involved, and the fewer people entered into the database, the more effective the
technology. Face Recognition, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/facerecognition [https://perma.cc/Q6NS-9ASH].
71. Harwell, supra note 24 (quoting Andrew Ferguson, a law professor at the University of the
District of Columbia, as saying that “[t]hese companies are taking advantage of the genuine fear and
almost impotence of parents who want to protect their kids . . . and they’re selling them surveillance
technology at a cost that will do very little to protect them”).
72. Researchers used an AI algorithm to trick Google’s image recognition software into
identifying a turtle as a rifle “because it identified hidden elements embedded in the image that shared
certain properties with an image of a gun, all of which were unnoticeable by the human eye.” Jonathan
Vanian, Artificial Intelligence Is Giving Rise to Fake Fingerprints. Here’s Why You Should Be Worried,
FORTUNE (Nov. 28, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/28/artificial-intelligence-fingerprints-security/
[https://perma.cc/DL4T-FRAJ].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Fortunately, it takes significant knowledge of the technology to beat it,
and many fingerprint sensor software companies employ additional security
measures, like heat sensors, to deter attacks. 76 Nonetheless, the fact that AI
systems can be tricked shows that these technologies must undergo significant
development before they can compete with humans for even some of the most
basic uses and certainly before these programs are released for high-level
security in schools. Humans must work alongside machines to make final
judgment calls and to catch threats that machines fail to identify. 77
D. Machine Bias
A major concern related to implementing AI technologies is the risk of
machine bias, which refers to systematic disparities in accuracies of algorithm
results, typically with respect to race, but also gender or age. 78 The identification
abilities of AI in biometrics are only as good as the humans who develop them.
A prominent AI expert and co-founder of AI4ALL79 described the issue as such:
“bias in, bias out.” 80
There is a severe lack of diversity in the artificial intelligence field. 81 One
major study found that women make up less than twenty percent of AI
professors, conference authors, and research staff at major technology

76. Id.
77. See, e.g., James Vincent, Google’s AI Thinks This Turtle Looks Like a Gun, Which Is a Problem,
VERGE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/2/16597276/google-ai-image-attacksadversarial-turtle-rifle-3d-printed [https://perma.cc/Z6ML-MCMR].
78. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/C8DL-NKTU]; Machine Bias, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/33036/machine-bias [https://perma.cc/QQ4R-6BNC]; Margaret Rouse, Machine Learning
Bias
(Algorithm
Bias
or
AI
Bias),
SEARCH
ENTERPRISE
AI,
https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/definition/machine-learning-bias-algorithm-bias-or-AI-bias
[https://perma.cc/9WB7-K3NF].
79. AI4ALL is a nonprofit “dedicated to increasing diversity and inclusion in AI education,
research, development, and policy.” Our Story, AI4ALL, http://ai-4-all.org/about/our-story/
[https://perma.cc/4JYX-V3UH].
80. Jessi Hempel, Fei-Fei Li’s Quest To Make AI Better for Humanity, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/fei-fei-li-artificial-intelligence-humanity/
[https://perma.cc/8ZZMC95W (dark archive)].
81. See SARAH MYERS WEST, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI NOW INST.,
DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI passim (Apr. 2019),
https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH8Y-AE94] (highlighting
the male domination and lack of people of color in the AI research and development field); see also Kari
Paul, ‘Disastrous’ Lack of Diversity in AI Industry Perpetuates Bias, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/16/artificial-intelligence-lack-diversity-new-yorkuniversity-study [https://perma.cc/L8WT-KEG8]; Jonathan Vanian, Eye on A.I.—How To Fix Artificial
Intelligence’s Diversity Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 23, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/04/23/artificialintelligence-diversity-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/84AE-9NHD].
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companies, 82 and people of color account for less than ten percent of AI
engineers at top companies. 83 The demographic makeup of employees of these
companies is reflected in the output of the machines. 84 Resulting machine bias
is, perhaps, reflective of the cultural perceptions and identities of the engineers.
However, it is difficult to study the potential consequences of machine bias
when the inner workings of surveillance technologies remain concealed. 85 There
is a void in the law when it comes to protecting students against these bias
errors. This must be addressed before releasing these largely untested
technologies on students.
1. Machine Bias Generally
There is limited research on the accuracy of facial recognition algorithms,86
and the information that does exist indicates disproportionate misidentification
of Black people, women, and young people. 87 False matches, or
misidentifications, occur when the system matches a scanned face to the wrong
person in a database. 88 For example, individual X may be scanned and matched
with the profile of fugitive Y. Individual X is then arrested under the
assumption he or she is actually fugitive Y.
82. See WEST ET AL., supra note 81, at 10–11 (finding women constitute eighteen percent of
authors at AI conferences in the field, less than twenty percent of AI professors, and between ten and
fifteen percent of AI research staff at large tech firms like Facebook and Google).
83. See id. at 11 (citing statistics from Google, Facebook, and Microsoft for Black and Latinx
employees).
84. See infra Section II.D.1; see also Angela Benton, An AI-Run World Needs To Better Reflect People
of Color, WIRED (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/an-ai-run-world-needs-to-betterreflect-people-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/YP4G-EZCD (dark archive)] (recommending that
incorporating more women and people of color into developer teams will improve potential machine
learning algorithms).
85. See supra Section II.B.
86. One reason for the lack of research is that these programs are mostly used by law enforcement
and such agencies actively try to keep the inner workings obscure. See Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle,
Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognitionsystems/476991/ [https://perma.cc/X6X2-RRZF (dark archive)]; Karen Hao, Police Across the U.S. Are
Training Crime-Predicting AIs on Falsified Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612957/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data/
[https://perma.cc/ZS9X-KCP3 (dark archive)]. Additionally, law enforcement systems “are not
required to undergo public or independent testing,” and agencies certainly are not volunteering this
information for evaluation. Garvie & Frankle, supra.
87. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 78 (discussing AI racial bias); Couch, supra note 68 (stating
that three facial recognition algorithms were less accurate when reading the faces of women, Black
people, and younger people); Garvie & Frankle, supra note 86 (discussing AI racial bias).
88. See, e.g., Kate Queram, Face-Recognition Tool Misidentified Lawmakers as Criminals: ACLU,
DEF. ONE (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/08/face-recognition-toolmisidentified-state-lawmakers-criminals-aclu/159190/ [https://perma.cc/8CJ9-F8E6]; Tom Simonite,
The Best Algorithms Struggle To Recognize Black Faces Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/
[https://perma.cc/7H8S-J45R (dark archive)].
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Misidentification is likely caused by problems with the development and
training of the software. A study authored by a researcher from the National
Institute of Standards and Technologies, which tests facial recognition products
every four years, found that while accuracy rates 89 have improved over the years,
accurate recognition is affected by the racial compositions of an algorithm’s
development team and the database of test photos. 90 This means that, for
example, algorithms developed in Germany more accurately identify
Caucasians while algorithms developed in Japan are better at identifying East
Asians. 91 In the melting pot of the United States, however, the algorithms were
“significantly better at recognizing Caucasian facial characteristics.” 92 A 2012
study of facial recognition algorithms used by U.S. law enforcement “found that
the algorithms were 5–10% less accurate when reading black faces over white
ones and showed similar discrepancies when analyzing faces of women and
younger people,” 93 and additional studies have found errors up to thirty-five
percent of the time for images of darker skin. 94 This flaw in facial recognition
algorithms has the potential to compound existing biases, particularly in light
of law enforcement’s already disproportionate mistreatment of Black people. 95
Since misidentifications of people of color lead to unnecessary interactions with
the police, and given the police are more likely to use force on people of color,
it follows that misidentification could lead to further harm. 96

89. The “accuracy rate” of a facial recognition algorithm is the rate at which the technology
accurately matches a face image to the database.
90. Garvie & Frankle, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Couch, supra note 68.
94. Steve Lohr, Facial Identification Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/EY7H-MNDE (dark archive)]. In contrast, identification of White men is accurate
up to ninety-nine percent of the time. Id.
95. See Devon W. Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing Our Own, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1979, 1992–95 (2018) (describing the impact of implicit bias resulting in disproportionate
mistreatment of Black people in policing, even by Black police officers); Quoctrung Bui & Amanda
Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use of Force but Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-policeuse-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/Z6F6-M7EB (dark archive)] (explaining
that while one study found no racial bias in police shootings, it did find that police officers are more
likely to use certain kinds of force against Black men than against other suspects: Black men are “more
likely to be touched, handcuffed, pushed to the ground or pepper-sprayed by a police officer”); German
Lopez, There Are Huge Racial Disparities in How US Police Use Force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killings-racism-racialdisparities [https://perma.cc/4W38-HHYX] (“Black people accounted for 31 percent of police killings
in 2012, even though they made up just 13 percent of the US population.”).
96. Bui & Cox, supra note 95; see also Kaitlyn Burton, Amazon Investors To Vote on Halting Face
Recognition Sales, LAW360 (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1146819/
amazon-investors-to-vote-on-halting-face-recognition-sales [https://perma.cc/6PL8-NQYX (dark
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2. Machine Bias in Schools
In the context of K-12 schools, these biases are even more problematic.
Students of color are already subjected to disproportionate disciplinary action
in K-12 schools,97 which ultimately places them at higher risk for entry into the
criminal justice system via the “school-to-prison pipeline.” 98 Inserting a flawed
surveillance system into the mix could further threaten access to education for
students of color, ultimately impacting their economic success and physical
health. 99 Further, facial detection readings of women’s faces are often
inaccurate. 100 Currently, “Black girls face high and disproportionate suspension
rates across the country—and it’s not because they are misbehaving more
frequently than other girls.” 101 Rooted in implicit bias and stereotyping, Black
girls are held to “lower academic expectations” and “make up disproportionately
high shares of girls who are retained in every single grade.” 102 Thus, it is not
much of a leap to anticipate a disproportionate number of instances where Black
girls are misidentified by facial recognition technology, such as a situation
where a school is looking at surveillance of a fight or another conduct violation.
This misidentification could result in disciplinary and negative academic
archive)] (“Critics have said the [Amazon facial recognition] technology could be used to spy on
minorities, such as undocumented immigrants or African-American activists.”).
97. See Tom Loveless, Racial Disparities in School Suspensions, BROOKINGS (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2017/03/24/racial-disparities-in-schoolsuspensions/ [https://perma.cc/B2F9-MMXQ] (“Suspensions of African American students occur at
rates three to four times higher than the state average for all students.”).
98. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA TASK FORCE ON REVERSING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 10
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/racial_ethnic_justice/Final%20
School2PrisonPipeline-2nd-012618.pdf [https://perma.cc/T33B-X76H] (“According to the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, discipline and other disparities are based on race
and cannot be explained by more frequent or serious misbehavior by minority students.”); School
Discipline and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/
education/resources/tools-and-strategies/table-talk/school-to-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/JQ522D3L] (“Largely as a result of ‘zero tolerance’ policies that mandate harsh punishments for even minor
misbehavior in schools, 3.3 million children are suspended or expelled from school each year, about
double the rate of the 1970s.”).
99. Students of color who do not complete high school receive lower salaries than their White
dropout counterparts. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WHEN GIRLS DON’T GRADUATE WE ALL FAIL
8
(2007),
https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/when_
girls_dont_graduate.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C7T-9F46]. Students of color are less likely to complete
high school than White students. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, THE DROPOUT CRISIS: A PUBLIC
HEALTH PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF SCHOOL-BASED CARE 2 (Feb. 2018), https://www.apha.org//media/files/pdf/sbhc/dropout_crisis [https://perma.cc/XM77-DEVF]. Individuals who do not attain a
high school education “are more likely to die prematurely from preventable conditions.” Id.
100. Couch, supra note 68.
101. Lauren Camera, Black Girls Are Twice As Likely To Be Suspended, in Every State, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 9, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2017-0509/black-girls-are-twice-as-likely-to-be-suspended-in-every-state [https://perma.cc/7357-95LR].
102. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., LET HER LEARN: STOPPING SCHOOL PUSHOUT FOR GIRLS
OF
COLOR
3
(2017),
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/final_nwlc_Gates_
GirlsofColor.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TV4-FYKY].
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consequences. If this technology is used to determine who was involved in a
conduct incident or who is permitted to enter the school, students of color will
be at risk of being misidentified as individuals who committed conduct
violations or are otherwise prohibited from entry.
Research also indicates that facial recognition technology has high rates of
inaccurate identification of younger faces,103 one of the target populations of
these scans in schools. There is no information regarding how accurately facial
recognition technology identifies developing faces. An eighth-grade student
may look very different at the end of a school year compared to the beginning
of the year, and teenagers, especially, tend to change their appearances. It is not
clear whether districts and these machines will be able to keep up. 104 Given the
uncertainty around accurate identification of young people, a threat of negative
impact on the academic environment remains. All students should feel
comfortable operating in their academic institutions without experiencing
embarrassment due to an erroneous identification or fearing interactions with
law enforcement.
If a child is misidentified by a machine, surely a human administrator
should be able to confirm the machine’s read before taking further action, but
such confirmation may still require that the student be pulled from class for
questioning. Perhaps after a fight in the hall, a camera identifies student X as
the culprit and the principal pulls that student from class to address the conduct
violation, but student X was misidentified. Even if an administrator ultimately
finds the identification to be inaccurate—perhaps student X was not even at
school that day—the harm of removing a student from class or making a
damning allegation against them is already done. What happens when a child’s
parent is misidentified? The resulting stigma could profoundly impact a young
person, who may be embarrassed and confused. Bullying in K-12 schools is
common, 105 and a student or parent being questioned or detained could lead to
bullying, making the academic environment unsafe and unwelcoming for that
student. Alternatively, fear of misidentification could lead caregivers to avoid
basic school functions, such as parent-teacher conferences, which may have
further deleterious effects on a child’s education. These are questions that, as of

103. Couch, supra note 68.
104. Emily Ann Brown, Biometric Security Boosts School Safety and Efficiency, DISTRICT ADMIN.
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://districtadministration.com/biometric-security-boosts-school-safety-efficiency/
[https://perma.cc/CEA2-UWPK] (“Unlike finger scans, students’ faces change as they grow. Creating
and ‘cleaning’ a database requires more effort, says Sara Collins, policy counsel for the Education
Privacy Project at the Future of Privacy Forum.”).
105. Amy Rock, Bullying Statistics Every K-12 Teacher, Parent and Student Should Know, CAMPUS
SAFETY MAG. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/bullying-statistics-k12/ [https://perma.cc/8D46-83TK] (reporting results from a 2016 National Center for Education
Statistics study that found that one in five students reported being bullied).
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now, appear to have no concrete answers but must be addressed before these
technologies are implemented for surveillance in K-12 environments.
An example of AI surveillance technology in a K-12 setting is Lockport
City School District in New York, which contracted with a security company
to install a high-tech system with facial recognition. 106 The district was slammed
by parents and privacy advocates with concerns that the software would
misidentify students and negatively affect the school climate. 107 The school
district planned to only upload images of individuals prohibited from entry or
students flagged for disciplinary issues, 108 but the system would still scan every
child for comparison against the database. 109 Further, the video surveillance
feature would have beefed up school discipline, allowing school officials to
upload a student photo and then track the student in the video system to
evaluate a disciplinary incident. 110 This harkens back to the concerns regarding
the likely disproportionate impact on students of color. After paying $1.4
million, contracting with the security company, and installing the camera
systems, the school district finally yielded to its critics and updated the school
security policy to reflect privacy protections. 111 The changes include limiting
access to the database to a few individuals with high security clearances, not
maintaining any alerts resulting from misidentification in students’ records, and
providing weekly updates to the Board of Education containing the names of
individuals added to the database. 112
Given all of the potential harms, schools should be concerned when
implementing advanced technologies for surveillance purposes. However, they
may also need to be worried about liability if they do not implement advanced
surveillance technologies. The proliferation of these technologies leaves open
questions about school liability under a negligence theory if a school declines to
implement available technologies. The question remains: If the technology is
available and school officials do not opt into using it, or misuse it, who is at fault
if there is a shooting at the school? Due to this potential for liability, schools
may be further incentivized to employ such technologies. Moreover, given that
106. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23.
107. Amy Rock, School Districts Consider Facial Recognition To Improve Security, CAMPUS SAFETY
MAG. (July 26, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/school-districts-facialrecognition/ [https://perma.cc/Z6KG-9FWD].
108. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23.
109. Mariella Moon, Facial Recognition Is Coming to U.S. Schools, Starting in New York, ENGADGET
(May 30, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/05/30/facial-recognition-us-schools-new-york/
[https://perma.cc/YE4U-GM3G].
110. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23.
111. Connor Hoffman, Lockport School Officials Update Security Policies Related to Facial Recognition
Software, LOCKPORT J. (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.lockportjournal.com/news/local_news/lockportschool-officials-update-security-policies-related-to-facial-recognition/article_41b1f38b-ad28-508a982f-6936641d2307.html [https://perma.cc/6UDT-TV2U].
112. Id.
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privacy laws are malleable at best, and there is not much in terms of legal
protection against bias, most of the incentives in this decision tend to encourage
schools to rush into using technologies without fully considering the risks or
harms.
III. PRIVACY LAWS AND SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE
There has been little exploration into the privacy implications of advanced
surveillance technologies in schools. This part provides background on several
privacy laws that already are, or very likely will be, applied to advanced
surveillance technologies in schools. It also argues that the appropriate actors
must clarify how these laws will apply to new technologies in order to inform
potential consumers about the risks they are facing. When it comes to these
technologies, the implementing authorities will undoubtedly have to navigate a
wide variety of laws that protect the privacy of schoolchildren.
Students are protected—to a certain extent—by the Fourth
Amendment. 113 FERPA governs the protection of student records 114 but is
currently limited in its ability to regulate information obtained from these
advanced technologies. Furthermore, a handful of states have begun passing
laws to protect students from biometric information gathering, and these state
laws are likely the most realistic and efficient path forward to privacy
protection. 115 As Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren predicted in their seminal
1890 paper The Right to Privacy, “Political, social, and economic changes entail
the recognition of new rights.” 116 Similarly, today’s surveillance state is altering
society to the point that privacy rights must be extended to children in schools
who are under the watchful eye of AI and biometrics.
A.

The Fourth Amendment
1. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Intangible Searches

Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the Fourth Amendment to
emerging technologies is limited but creates a potential framework for
evaluating AI in schools. Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was

113. See infra Section III.A.
114. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 1, 2018)
[hereinafter FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/
index.html [https://perma.cc/DC2R-HADE].
115. See Andrew Ujifusa, State Lawmakers Ramp Up Attention to Data Privacy, EDUC. WK. (Apr.
15, 2014) [hereinafter Ujifusa, Ramp Up Attention], https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2014/04/16/28data.h33.html [https://perma.cc/4QLB-P8B9 (dark archive)] (providing an overview of
biometric data laws that impact schools in Florida and Kansas); see also discussion infra Section III.B.
116. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
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historically limited to a physical conception of privacy invasion and has been
slow to catch up to technological advancements. In 1928, the Supreme Court
ruled in Olmstead v. United States 117 that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping and that the amendment does not
apply “unless there has been an official search and seizure of [a] person, or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.” 118
However, in his scathing dissent, the forward-thinking Justice Brandeis
challenged the majority’s hesitance to consider technological advances:
“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been, but of what may be.” . . . Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security? 119
It took nearly forty years for the Supreme Court to overturn Olmstead 120
and catch up to rapidly advancing technological progress as Justice Brandeis had
urged. In 1967, the Court held in Katz v. United States 121 that “the reach of [the
Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure,” and thus the government’s wiretapping of
a phone booth “constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.” 122 The resulting updated framework for determining
whether something is a search came not from the majority opinion but from
Justice Harlan’s concurrence. 123 This two-pronged “Katz test” asks whether (1)

117. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
118. Id. at 466 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
119. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’s opinion was much in line with the paper
he published in 1890. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 116, at 193 (“[T]he term ‘property’ has grown
to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”).
120. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[A]lthough a closely divided Court
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material
object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard
without any ‘technical trespass under . . . local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1960))).
121. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
122. Id. at 353.
123. See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).

98 N.C. L. REV. 438 (2020)

2020]

SCHOOL OF SURVEILLANCE

461

the “person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and
(2) the “expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 124 The test was quickly adopted by the full Court as the standard
for assessing Fourth Amendment cases and continues to be used today. 125
Despite this crucial development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
laws regulating intangible surveillance technologies still face uncertainty in the
courts. 126 Most recently, the Court held in a splintered decision in Carpenter v.
United States 127 that the Fourth Amendment protects historical cell-site location
information (“CSLI”). 128 Cell-sites are radio towers that connect a phone to the
wireless network, and the resulting CSLI is a time-stamped record generated
from a phone connecting to the wireless network that places an individual near
that particular cell-site at the times recorded. 129 Wireless carriers retain CSLI
as business records,130 but in Carpenter a court had ordered MetroPCS and
Sprint to disclose the CSLI of individuals suspected of a robbery. 131 The CSLI
placed the suspect’s phone near the robbery by showing that the phone was
pinging off of cell-sites surrounding the crime scene at the time of the crime. 132
After the defendant was convicted, the case made its way to the Supreme Court,
where the defendant argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy to
his CSLI. 133 The Justices took different approaches to the Fourth Amendment
inquiry, disagreeing about which privacy test to use and whether CSLI should
be considered protected at all. 134 The result of Carpenter did not provide a simple
124. Id. at 361.
125. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (citing Katz in employing a “reasonable
expectation” of privacy standard, merely one year after the Katz decision); see also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim
a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by
government action.”).
126. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that the installation of a
GPS device on defendant’s car was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Everett v. State, 186 A.3d
1224, 1236 (Del. 2018) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when posting photographs on social media). But see United States v. James, No. 18-cr-216, 2018 WL
6566000, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2018) (declining to address the issue of whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to cell tower records that differ from those narrowly addressed in
Carpenter).
127. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
128. Id. at 2221.
129. Id. at 2211.
130. Id. at 2212.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2212–13.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 2219 (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test); id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the property-based test should be applied because property-based concepts
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test going forward; in fact, the Court specified that its decision was a “narrow
one.” 135 Schools looking to Carpenter to answer questions about what is
protected under the Fourth Amendment may gain some insights but have no
assurances about the degree to which it applies to AI surveillance.
2. T.L.O.’s Two-Pronged Test for Searches in Schools
In the context of schools, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy is a complicated issue. The Fourth Amendment is made
applicable to public schools through the Fourteenth Amendment 136 and, to a
certain extent, protects students from unreasonable searches and seizures in
school. In the 1985 landmark case New Jersey v. T.L.O., 137 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the Fourth Amendment’s “prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.”138
After holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to school officials as state
actors, the Court set forth a relaxed, two-part framework for analyzing searches
by school officials: the first question asks whether the search was “justified at
its inception,” and the second asks whether the search was reasonable in scope. 139
The Court explained that “a search [by school officials] will be permissible
in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction.” 140 The two-pronged test was derived
from the “reasonable suspicion” standard the Court set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 141
The Court did not require probable cause for searches in schools because it
concluded that the reasonableness standard would “neither unduly burden the
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize
unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.” 142 The T.L.O.
decision was a turning point in jurisprudence about school discipline because it
established a Fourth Amendment framework and consequently shifted the
landscape of school security.
have “long grounded the analytical framework” of Fourth Amendment cases); id. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (advocating for a textual-based approach by arguing that the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment should ultimately determine the outcome of the case).
135. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (“We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time
CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell
site during a particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into
question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”).
136. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (holding that the actions of public school
officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment).
137. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
138. Id. at 333.
139. Id. at 341.
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
142. Id. at 342–43.
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While there have not been many opportunities for courts to grapple with
the appropriateness and constitutionality of various forms of electronic
surveillance in schools,143 the relationship between intangible searches, as
addressed in Katz, and searches in schools, as addressed in T.L.O., came to a
head as recently as 2008. In the Sixth Circuit case Brannum v. Overton County
School Board, 144 officials at a public middle school installed video cameras
throughout the school, including in locker rooms. 145 A group of students sued,
arguing that “their constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses the
right not to be videotaped while dressing and undressing in school athletic
locker rooms—a place specifically designated by the school authorities for such
intimate, personal activity.”146
With no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit cases on point, the Brannum
court utilized the T.L.O. framework. 147 In determining that the installation of
surveillance cameras passed T.L.O.’s justified-at-inception prong, the court
stated that “the policy of setting up video surveillance equipment throughout
the school was instituted for the sake of increasing security, which is an
appropriate and common sense purpose.”148 However, the school crossed the
line of Fourth Amendment limitations regarding the scope of the search.
According to the Brannum court, the search was unreasonable in scope because
“even in locker rooms, students retain ‘a significant privacy interest in their
unclothed bodies.’” 149 While the Sixth Circuit’s ruling may have been
unsurprising because videotaping minors in various stages of undress seems
innately wrong, the court’s rationale was not so narrow as to limit the decision’s
implications to similar situations. The Sixth Circuit instead took a broad
approach, asserting that “[v]ideo surveillance is inherently intrusive.” 150 Under
this reasoning, regardless of its location or the level of intimacy it may capture,
video surveillance raises privacy concerns.
Five years later in G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools,151 the Sixth Circuit
again found itself applying the T.L.O. framework and Brannum principles, this
time to determine whether a school official violated the Fourth Amendment
143. This is unsurprising given that this is a new issue, the rate at which technology is developing,
and the Supreme Court’s aversion to questions about technology. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The
Supreme Court Is Stubbornly Analog—By Design, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 29, 2018)
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-is-stubbornly-analog-by-design/
[https://perma.cc/VX6E-LD2C] (“The Supreme Court is an openly—even proudly—technophobic
institution.”).
144. 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 492.
146. Id. at 494.
147. Id. at 494–95.
148. Id. at 496.
149. Id. (quoting Beard v. Whitemore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005)).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013).
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when she confiscated a student’s cell phone and read his text messages. 152 In a
decision rooted in the T.L.O. two-pronged reasonableness framework, the court
declined to approve of the search, finding that “using a cell phone on school
grounds does not automatically trigger an essentially unlimited right enabling
a school official to search any content stored on the phone that is not related
either substantively or temporally to the infraction.”153 Here, the Sixth Circuit
focused primarily on the justified-at-inception prong of the T.L.O. framework
when finding that “[t]he defendants have failed to demonstrate how anything
in this sequence of events indicated to them that a search of the phone would
reveal evidence of criminal activity, impending contravention of additional
school rules, or potential harm to anyone in the school.” 154 G.C. did not involve
electronic surveillance in the context of cameras, but by searching the phone,
the school was able to acquire information about the student that they would
not have been able to obtain without the technology. The court applied Fourth
Amendment principles in the context of a form of technology that is used with
increasing frequency, indicating the judiciary’s willingness to apply Fourth
Amendment principles to modern technology in the school context. It sheds
light on the ways in which courts are approaching schools’ searches of students
using technology as a medium. 155
3. Complexities of Applying the T.L.O. Framework to AI Surveillance
These cases indicate that courts will likely apply the T.L.O. framework to
Fourth Amendment challenges to school surveillance programs, but uncertainty
remains. As Justice Brandeis anticipated in his Olmstead dissent, 156 courts and
lawmakers have been hesitant to take positions on emerging technologies that
have the potential to implicate privacy. 157 If the “inherently intrusive” argument
from Brannum is widely applied, it could significantly limit the scope of video
surveillance in schools. 158 However, it remains to be seen whether jurisdictions
beyond the Sixth Circuit will adopt that view; courts have not yet considered
many cases involving the implication of student rights under the Fourth

152. Id. at 626, 632.
153. Id. at 632–33.
154. Id. at 634; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–2 (1985) (explaining that a search will
be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will reveal a
violation of the law or school rules).
155. See Know Your Rights: Student Cell Phone Privacy, AM. C.L. UNION N. CAL.,
https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/know-your-rights/student-cell-phone-privacy
[https://perma.cc/S4DS-WX5L].
156. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
157. See infra Section III.C (presenting an overview of current state laws).
158. But see Marriott v. USD 204, Bonner Springs-Edwardsville, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1240
(D. Kan. 2017) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a classroom because it is a
public place).
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Amendment and particularly have not addressed questions of school
surveillance.
Notably, Brannum and G.C. were wins for student rights, but the T.L.O.
standard remains a relaxed application of the Fourth Amendment and is thus
more susceptible to interpretations that weaken protections of student privacy.
While T.L.O. held that school officials are considered state actors and are
obligated to act within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment when
conducting searches in schools, the Court also endorsed the lesser “reasonable
suspicion” prerequisite for searches conducted by school officials. 159 In contrast
to school officials, police officers generally must have “probable cause” to
conduct a search or seizure. 160 The intersection of T.L.O. and the increase of
surveillance mechanisms in schools therefore may lead to confusion with respect
to how these requirements apply to school resource officers,161 who are law
enforcement officers but work in a capacity similar to school officials. 162 In
People v. Dilworth, 163 the Illinois Supreme Court categorized school search cases
involving the police and found that “most courts have held that the reasonable
suspicion test” applies where “school officials initiate a search or where police
involvement is minimal” and in situations “involving school police or liaison
officers acting on their own authority.” 164 However, “where outside police
officers initiate a search,” courts typically require probable cause. 165 Dilworth
provides a helpful survey of court opinions, but as a state court case, its
determinations are not binding outside of its limited jurisdiction.
Since there is no clear answer regarding the Fourth Amendment
implications of existing security mechanisms in schools, evolving AI systems
raise even more confusion. The justified-at-inception prong of the search may
look different in the AI context. For example, it is unclear whether a facial
recognition camera’s alert to a school administrator that someone on the
blacklist has entered campus would meet the requirement. Furthermore, the
biometric scanning of students each time they walk through a different door in
the school building may reach beyond a “reasonable scope” under the framework
because scanning children’s faces multiple times per day may be “excessively
159. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 345; see supra text accompanying notes 141–42.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. When an officer has only reasonable suspicion, rather than probable
cause, that an individual is armed, about to commit a crime, or engaged in a crime, the officer may
“stop and frisk” the individual, which involves a brief detention and a pat-down. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 24–26 (1968).
161. Bernard James, Student Searches: Part II: Fine-Tuning the Educator/SRO Relationship, J. SCH.
SAFETY
(2008),
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Student-Searches-JOSSSummer-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/62MK-H6SM].
162. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS,
https://nasro.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/GU6J-23V7].
163. 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996).
164. Id. at 317.
165. Id.
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intrusive.” Schools and law enforcement may very well be opening themselves
up to liability under the Fourth Amendment for conducting improper searches.
Without further guidance from the courts, which likely will not come for a
while, many of these technologies will likely cause inconsistencies across schools
in how the T.L.O. framework is applied.
B.

FERPA

The Fourth Amendment is not the only limiting factor on the potential
breadth of use of AI surveillance technologies. Congress has also stepped in to
protect schoolchildren’s privacy. FERPA is a federal law that “protects the
privacy of student education records” and “gives parents certain rights with
respect to [those] records.” 166 Generally, FERPA prevents schools from sharing
“personally identifiable information,” which is distinguished from “directory
information.”167 FERPA may be traditionally viewed as governing disciplinary
records or specific grades but in most situations includes photos and videos of
students as part of the protected education record. 168
Despite its ostensible purpose to protect student privacy, there is little
certainty as to whether or how FERPA protects student data collected through
forms of AI surveillance. Outside of a plain reading of the student privacy law,
there are many exceptions to FERPA protection. These include two exceptions
relevant to the school surveillance context: the “health or safety exception” 169
and the “school officials exception.” 170 These exceptions allow schools, in some
cases, to distort the original intent of the law and disclose information that
should remain private.
Two dichotomous problems are often raised in the context of FERPA: (1)
FERPA is not stringent enough and allows education agencies to disclose too
much information without consent, 171 and (2) FERPA is used as a shield by
166. FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 114; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. IV
2016).
167. § 1232g(a)(5)(A), (b)(2) (“[T]he term ‘directory information’ relating to a student includes
the following: the student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of
study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of
athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous
educational agency or institution attended by the student.”).
168. See FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa
[https://perma.cc/G6YY298C].
169. See infra Section III.B.2.
170. See infra Section III.B.3.
171. Benjamin Herold, Arne Duncan Responds to Criticism Over Student Data Privacy, EDUC. WK.
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2014/04/duncan_on_data_
privacy_technol.html [https://perma.cc/QSF9-FN8C (dark archive)] (“Some privacy advocates,
including Khaliah Barnes, a lawyer for the Washington-based nonprofit Electronic Privacy Information
Center, argue that FERPA is too outdated and weak to protect children’s information in this era of big
data and ubiquitous digital devices and tools.”); Jake New, Staying Confidential, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
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education agencies to hide information they do not want to reveal to the
public. 172 With respect to the second criticism, some groups in recent years have
criticized schools’ use of FERPA as a shield to cover up wrongdoing and hide
from bad publicity. 173 Even the original sponsor of the law, former Senator
James L. Buckley, recently called out “a pattern where the universities and
colleges have used [FERPA] as an excuse for not giving out any information
they didn’t want to give.” 174 When it comes to AI, these issues will only become
more complex, and, without Congress strengthening FERPA, much of the
collected information will be at risk of disclosure.
1. Development of FERPA
Congress passed FERPA in 1974 with the intention of protecting
students. 175 The law was originally passed with little discussion, but after public
backlash, the bill’s sponsors issued a statement “emphasiz[ing] the need for
parents to have access to the information contained in student education records
in order to protect their children’s interests.” 176 FERPA was subsequently
amended to explicitly protect the privacy of students’ personally identifiable
information by “strengthen[ing] the right of students to a hearing to challenge
the content of records they believe are inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/03/privacy-loophole-remains-openafter-outrage-over-u-oregons-handling-therapy-records [https://perma.cc/P222-RMU2].
172. Amye Bensenhaver, Kentucky Universities Continue To Hide Behind FERPA, FORWARD KY.
(June 12, 2019), https://forwardky.com/kentucky-universities-continue-to-hide-behind-ferpa/
[https://perma.cc/QM5L-BZKS]; Frank D. LoMonte, Ferpa Frustrations: It’s Time for Reform, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (May 9, 2010), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Ferpa-Frustrations-ItsTime/65419 [https://perma.cc/WEF2-6KJU (dark archive)].
173. Zach Greenberg, Let Ferpa Be Ferpa, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Let-Ferpa-Be-Ferpa/242232 [https://perma.cc/Y9U3-ZT7A (dark
archive)] (“[FERPA] has been invoked to stifle police investigations into campus crime and cover up
scandal after scandal concerning college athletics, cronyism in admissions practices, and administrative
malfeasance.”); Tamar Lewin, Privacy and Press Freedom Collide in University Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/education/21privacy.html [https://perma.cc/TC28MAHT (dark archive)] (discussing a legal battle between the University of Illinois and The Chicago
Tribune over documents related to the university’s longstanding admission of well-connected students:
“The Tribune, backed by media groups including The New York Times, argues that the documents are
not education records under the federal law, but rather records of questionable conduct, so the public’s
right to know should prevail”); George Schroeder, It’s Clear the ‘O’ Stands for Opaque, REGISTERGUARD (Feb. 18, 2011), http://special.registerguard.com/csp/cms/sites/web/sports/columnists/
25904339-41/records-public-ncaa-oregon-ferpa.csp [https://perma.cc/6TVQ-LHTQ] (discussing the
University of Oregon’s denial of a newspaper’s open-records request where one journalism professor
called the university’s denial “an abuse of FERPA to conceal records of an NCAA investigation into
possible rules violations by student athletes”).
174. Schroeder, supra note 173.
175. See 121 CONG. REC. 13,990 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Buckley).
176. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.
[hereinafter FERPA, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO CTR.], https://epic.org/privacy/student/ferpa/
[https://perma.cc/VD5L-ARVT].
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violation of their privacy or other rights.”177 The law has been amended a
number of times to account for new issues. 178 However, the Department of
Education weakened FERPA in 2008 through rulemaking in spite of opposition
by privacy advocates and civil liberties groups. 179 The 2008 rule amended
FERPA regulations to “authorize the disclosure of education records without
consent to contractors, consultants, volunteers, and other outside parties to
whom an educational agency or institution has outsourced institutional services
or functions.” 180
In recent years, there have been demands for the U.S. Department of
Education to issue guidance to clarify FERPA’s scope and application, and
some critics have pressured Congress to update the law to meet new security
and privacy needs created by advanced technology. 181 Although the 2008 rule
received flak for its expansion of record disclosure, it did expand the definition
of “personally identifiable information” to include biometric data under the
statute. 182 The rule clarified that a student’s biometric record includes
“fingerprints; retina and iris patterns; voiceprints; DNA sequence; facial
characteristics; and handwriting.” 183 This update was a vital step in protecting
students from disclosure of personal information obtained through advanced

177. Id.; see Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, sec. 2(4)(A), § 438(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1855, 1861
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)).
178. See FERPA, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 176 (listing the nine amendments
to FERPA since its enactment); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
179. See, e.g., Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, & Christopher R. Calabrese, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Regina Miles,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Educ.
(May
23,
2011),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
ACLU_Comments_on_Changes_to_the_Family_Educational_Rights_and_Privacy_Act_FERPA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5BC-9LRV] (“This notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) represents a
significant new privacy invasion.”); ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., COMMENTS OF ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (May 23, 2011),
https://epic.org/privacy/student/EPIC_FERPA_Comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4SX-BKJB]
(“Expanding third party access to student data is contrary to FERPA, given the purpose of the Act.”).
180. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,806, 74,806 (Dec. 9, 2008) (codified
as amended at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2019)).
181. See Greenberg, supra note 173; Henry Kronk, Student Data Security Is at Risk. We Need To
Update FERPA, ELEARNING INSIDE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://news.elearninginside.com/student-datasecurity-is-at-risk-we-need-to-update-ferpa/ [https://perma.cc/GQM7-G7FF]; Andrew Ujifusa, School
Officials Urge Congress to Update Student-Data Privacy Law, EDUC. WK. (May 17, 2018),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k12/2018/05/school_officials_student_data_privacy_law_congress_urge.html [https://perma.cc/GRY9TSMT (dark archive)]; see also Benjamin Herold, Trump School Safety Commission: Time To Update
FERPA,
EDUC.
W K.
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/
DigitalEducation/2018/12/school_safety_commission_ferpa.html
[https://perma.cc/CVK9-KG7U
(dark archive)].
182. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,851 (codified as amended at 34
C.F.R. § 99.3(d) (2019)).
183. Id.
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technologies. Nonetheless, all personally identifiable information, including
biometric information, may be disclosed if it falls within a FERPA exception.
2. The “Health or Safety Exception” and Surveillance
As part of its 2008 rule, which was promulgated one year after the mass
shooting at Virginia Tech, 184 the Department of Education clarified when
typically protected student information may be disclosed for health or safety
reasons. 185 The “health or safety exception,” as it is called, gives schools “greater
flexibility and deference” to disclose educational records without consent to
“appropriate parties,” which could include law enforcement or emergency
responders, among others. 186 The exception may be employed in the presence
of an “actual, impending, or imminent emergency”—including “a campus
shooting”—and any information released must be related to the emergency. 187
The Department’s recently released School Safety Commission Final
Report demonstrates that the boundaries of the health and safety exception are
less than clear; schools remain confused about when FERPA protects safetyrelated student information and when that information falls within the
exception. 188 The Department’s report explained that law enforcement officers
who “[sought] access to school surveillance footage to help ensure school safety”
were denied access by schools that claimed the footage was protected by
FERPA. 189 The officers in those cases believed that FERPA permitted them to
access the footage. 190 In an attempt to dispel this confusion, the Department
explained, “If a school’s security department or campus police maintains the
school’s surveillance video system and, as a result, creates surveillance footage
for a law enforcement purpose, FERPA would not prevent sharing the
surveillance footage with local law enforcement.” 191
The report does not clear up all of the confusion surrounding FERPA
information-sharing permissions as applied to surveillance technologies. The
Department’s explanation seems to consider all school surveillance footage to
be for a law enforcement purpose and thus shareable under the exception. 192
Moreover, the report specifies that a school official can be designated “as the

184. See Hauser & O’Connor, supra note 1.
185. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,854.
186. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 129–30; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a) (2019).
187. When Is It Permissible To Utilize FERPA’s Health or Safety Emergency Exception for Disclosures?,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/when-it-permissible-utilize-ferpa’s-health-orsafety-emergency-exception-disclosure [https://perma.cc/VRY2-BRZH].
188. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 131.
189. Id. at 132.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id.
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school’s law enforcement unit for this purpose.” 193 This will allow for the
exposure of more student information to law enforcement and will make it more
difficult to determine which individuals may gain access to FERPA-protected
information and under which exception they may have a claim to that
information. It seems that this would leave the door open for a school to
overutilize this exception.
In 2018, the Department released a Frequently Asked Questions resource
to clarify how photos and videos are protected under FERPA. 194 Arguably, this
only complicated matters further. The FAQ stated that if responsibility for
videos falls with the school’s “law enforcement unit,” the videos are not
education records under FERPA and could be given to the police without
consent or an exception. 195 However, if the videos are education records—which
they presumably would be if they were not maintained by the school law
enforcement unit—then there must be written consent, an applicable exception,
or a judicial order before such records could be given to police. 196
This explanation leaves much to be desired. Without a clearer standard,
students will not know the extent to which video footage may be shared,
particularly as it seems schools themselves struggle with understanding the
rules. 197 The FAQ and the resulting confusion also have the potential to lead to
more student encounters with the police. Student interactions with the police
should remain as limited as possible in order to maintain the sanctity of the
educational environment and avoid the variety of long-term negative
consequences that can result from student encounters with law enforcement.
3. The “School Officials Exception” and Discretion
Another exception, the “school officials exception,” allows “[e]ducational
agencies and institutions [to] disclose [personally identifiable information] from
education records without consent to school officials (including School
Resource Officers), provided they meet the school’s criteria for ‘school officials’
with ‘legitimate educational interests.’” 198 This exception leaves a significant
amount of discretion to the schools to determine who qualifies as a “school
official.” One consequence of the exception is that schools could designate
School Resource Officers (“SROs”) as school officials, thus creating a backdoor

193. Id.
194. Eric Barba, Got a FERPA Request for Video? Consult the April 2018 FPCO Guidance Before
Responding, CONN. EDUC. L. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.connecticuteducationlawblog.com/
2018/08/articles/ferpa/got-a-ferpa-request-for-video-consult-the-april-2018-fpco-guidance-beforeresponding/ [https://perma.cc/U5YY-XK8D]; FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, supra note 168.
195. FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, supra note 168.
196. Id.
197. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 131.
198. Id. at 130 (emphasis added); see 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2019).

98 N.C. L. REV. 438 (2020)

2020]

SCHOOL OF SURVEILLANCE

471

to the health and safety exception, which otherwise grants access to law
enforcement officers in emergency situations only.
The Department’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center issued a Q&A in
February 2019 to shed some light on the relationship between law enforcement,
SROs, and FERPA, and it revealed just how easily a school can make this
designation. 199 If a law enforcement officer is an employee of the school and
constitutes a “school official with a legitimate educational interest” according to
the school’s definition, the officer could then be considered a school official. 200
SROs and off-duty officers could also easily meet the requirements of being
school officials simply by ensuring school safety, meeting the school’s definition
of school official, remaining subject to the use and redisclosure requirements of
FERPA, and having a memorandum of understanding with the school. 201 The
ease with which schools can allow law enforcement to access student
information, even when it is limited to the purposes of promoting “school safety
and the physical security of students,” 202 is extremely concerning with respect
to the protection of students’ rights. In addition to the risks associated with law
enforcement interactions, as discussed in Part II, allowing SROs and other
officers to act as school officials will further blur the line between police, who
need probable cause to conduct a search, and school officials, who merely need
reasonable suspicion. Thus, it will be easier for law enforcement to search
students and consequently interfere with students’ educational experiences.
The wide latitude the exception provides to schools to designate school
officials, and therefore decide who has access to student records, may also create
199. See PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL RESOURCE
OFFICERS, SCHOOL LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS, AND THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND
PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) 14 (Feb. 2019), https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/
resource_document/file/SRO_FAQs_2-5-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y59-EC8L].
200. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. SROs and off-duty officers may
qualify as “school officials” under FERPA if they:
1. Perform an institutional service or function for which the school or district would otherwise
use employees (e.g., to ensure school safety);
2. Are under the “direct control” of the school or district with respect to the use and
maintenance of the education records (e.g., through a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
that establishes data use restrictions and data protection requirements);
3. Are subject to FERPA’s use and re-disclosure requirements in 34 CFR § 99.33(a), which
provides that the PII from education records may be used only for the purposes for which the
disclosure was made (e.g., to promote school safety and the physical security of students), and
which limits the re-disclosure of PII from education records; and
4. Meet the criteria specified in the school or district’s annual notification of FERPA rights
for being school officials with legitimate educational interests in the education records.
Id. at 12.
202. Id.
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inconsistent approaches under FERPA from school to school or even over time
on a single campus, which could further confuse students and parents. While
schools may have different discipline codes, all public schools are bound by the
same federal law, so it follows normatively that a student should have the same
legal protections regardless of which public school they attend. While it is
important that schools have the autonomy to operate in the way that best meets
the needs of their specific communities, the amount of discretion left to schools
under this exception potentially allows schools to push the limits of FERPA
and act in a way that is contrary to its intent. Students should have clarity as to
whether their information will be protected and how their school’s policies
comport with the requirements. School autonomy should not come at the
expense of student privacy.
An additional issue regarding the school officials exception is what,
exactly, falls into the category of a “legitimate educational interest.” 203 Schools
must provide students with their own definitions of what constitutes a
“legitimate educational interest.” 204 The National Forum on Education
Statistics (“NFES”), a subdivision of the Department of Education’s National
Center for Education Statistics, issued a guide to help education agencies
understand their responsibilities to protect student information, including how
to apply the school officials exception. 205 In the section of the guide entitled
“Defining ‘Legitimate Educational Interests,’” NFES fails to provide any
precise definition of the term, suggesting only that schools “could make broad
decisions based on legal requirements and good practices.” 206 While the guide
does include a brief sample policy for schools to use as a model, the NFES guide
is not official departmental guidance, and thus it is possible that adherence to
the model would not be sufficient to preclude a school from liability 207 for
wrongly considering a specific situation to constitute a “legitimate educational

203. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2012 & Sup. IV 2016). A school official generally has a
legitimate educational interest if the official needs to review an education record in order to fulfill his
or her professional responsibility. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND
PRIVACY ACT: GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBLE STUDENTS 3 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., FERPA GUIDANCE],
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/for-eligiblestudents.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U6V-2NEM].
204. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FERPA GUIDANCE, supra note 203, at 3; see 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.31(a)(1)(i)(A) (2019).
205. NAT’L FORUM ON EDUC. STATISTICS, FORUM GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF
STUDENT INFORMATION, at vii (Mar. 2004), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004330.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E99P-4BTY].
206. Id. at 51.
207. The Department of Education is the FERPA enforcement body and thus oversees
compliance. An individual may file a complaint with the Department to hold their institution
accountable. The Supreme Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce FERPA.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).
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interest.” 208 The lack of clarity could open the door to school officials accessing
sensitive information about students without actual legitimate reasons to do so.
Further, FERPA permits schools to consider even some third parties to
be school officials under this exception if the party “[p]erforms an institutional
service or function” otherwise performed by an employee, is “under the direct
control” of the school “with respect to the use and maintenance of education
records,” and is subject to requirements concerning personally identifiable
information. 209 This could be interpreted to include security companies that
handle a wide range of student data, such as face images, fingerprints, location
services, and attendance records. Even if third parties are prevented from
selling data, there are risks of security breaches and violations of agreements.
The closest the Department of Education has come to addressing this
third-party issue was in the context of education technology companies, which
primarily support personalized learning platforms and other educational
classroom software. 210 After one school required a parent to “accept the terms
and conditions of its third-party online learning platforms in order to enroll her
child,” the Department found that the school had violated FERPA by
impermissibly conditioning enrollment on a waiver of “the rights and
protections accorded under FERPA.” 211 This indicates there is some basis in the
Department’s own precedent for the argument that a school cannot force its
students to allow biometric information to be uploaded into a system
maintained by a third party. Nevertheless, the Department has failed to provide
unequivocal guidance.
4. Concerns Regarding Applicability of FERPA to AI Surveillance
While the health and safety and school officials exceptions could be vital
for security enhancements, in practice they make FERPA more malleable.
Although the exceptions may occasionally be critical to prevent violence and
self-harm, the Department has expanded FERPA to the point that it has opened
some serious loopholes. Critics believe FERPA has been weakened to the point
that it is practically useless and merely a protective cover for schools to avoid
liability. 212 For instance, to consider all school surveillance video systems to be
within the reach of law enforcement is to contradict the very purpose of

208. See NAT’L FORUM ON EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 205, at 51.
209. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B).
210. Lindsey Barrett & Amelia Vance, Dept of Ed: Schools Cannot Require Parents or Students To
Waive Their FERPA Rights Through Ed Tech Company’s Terms of Service, FERPA SHERPA (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://ferpasherpa.org/ptac1/ [https://perma.cc/Q5RV-7DFR].
211. Id.
212. Greenberg, supra note 173; Schroeder, supra note 173.
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FERPA. FERPA’s original intent to protect the privacy of student records 213 is
now at risk of being abandoned in the face of technologies that extract mass
amounts of data from students.
In its December 2018 Final Report, the Department of Education’s
Federal Commission on School Safety called on Congress to collaborate in an
effort to “modernize FERPA to account for changes in technology since its
enactment” so that more advanced (and potentially more invasive) security
technologies can be installed in schools for the purpose of reducing violence,
including shootings. 214 Just as the courts have neglected to develop the law in
keeping up with technological innovation, so has Congress. FERPA needs a
new face—one that actually protects student privacy and clearly specifies when
it is appropriate to step outside the confines of the law to prevent harm to
students and others.
In fact, if strengthened, FERPA could supplement privacy protections
beyond what the T.L.O. framework provides. The law could be amended to
provide for explicit considerations regarding the private nature of information
obtained through advanced technologies, specifying how the exceptions
comport with technology and safety needs. There is a difference between
personally identifiable information in the form of video or fingerprints and
personally identifiable information in the form of attendance records. The
former is inherently more personal and has the potential to expose the student
to more negative consequences if released. Congress must consider and make
explicit FERPA’s applicability to surveillance data as schools implement AI
technologies, particularly when the data (e.g., face images and fingerprint scans)
is being stored in a system owned by an outside company. These systems are of
heightened concern, particularly if they also surmise students’ feelings,
behaviors, and activities, as is the case with the “smart eye” technology discussed
earlier. 215 As applied to threat assessment programs, an additional layer of
concern exists around the safeguarding of data pertaining to students’ mental
health. 216 There is a delicate, complex balance between FERPA as a privacy
protector and FERPA as a barrier to preventing school shootings. At the very
least, to avoid compliance violations and liability under FERPA, students and
guardians should be directly informed about what information AI companies
are using in the name of security, how and where it is stored, and what is being
done or could be done with the information. 217
213. See 121 CONG. REC. 13,990 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Buckley); FERPA, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 176 (“FERPA protects the confidentiality of student educational
records.”).
214. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 133.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
216. See Stolzoff, supra note 57.
217. Members of Congress recently introduced a bill that would regulate facial recognition
technology in commercial settings, but it does not address FERPA. See Commercial Facial Recognition
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State Laws

While the federal government has been slow to act, states have taken it
upon themselves to deal with student safety and security through state
legislation. In 2018 alone, more than fifty state school safety bills were signed
into law. 218 Since 2013, forty-one states have passed 126 laws that in some way
address student privacy. 219 Many of the privacy laws address testing standards
and data breach policies, 220 and some concern the relationship between student
data and outside technology vendors. 221 However, only a handful of states have
taken legislative action to limit the collection of biometric data in public
schools. 222 Until the federal government begins to answer these questions, states
should enact laws to ensure the protection of students’ rights. In fact, a trend of
state action may lead Congress to make changes.
1. Existing State Laws Regarding Biometrics in Schools
The few states that have acted to protect student biometric data have taken
different approaches to the issue. In 2014, Florida completely banned 223
biometric data collection in public schools after state lawmakers cited the need
for student privacy and protection. 224 The general sentiment by Florida
lawmakers was that biometrics should not be used until there is more
information about how it works and what will happen with the data. 225 Florida
Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing regulation of facial recognition technology
in business without mentioning regulation in school settings); Press Release, Roy Blunt, U.S. Senator
for Mo., Blunt, Schatz Introduce Bipartisan Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act (Mar. 14,
2019),
https://www.blunt.senate.gov/news/press-releases/blunt-schatz-introduce-bipartisancommercial-facial-recognition-privacy-act [perma.cc/7X4R-V6DB] (discussing the purpose of the
proposed legislation).
218. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
219. State Student Privacy Laws, FERPA SHERPA (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ferpasherpa.org/statelaws/ [https://perma.cc/DM3V-F3N6].
220. Id. (indicating, for example, that Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas,
and Kentucky have laws addressing testing standards and data breaches).
221. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (West 2017) (preventing K-12 technology service
providers from disclosing much of the information they acquire); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A,
§ 953 (Westlaw through 1st Spec. Sess. of 129th Leg.) (requiring technology operators to obtain explicit
consent from parents or eligible students before using student data for a number of enumerated
purposes); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.272 (LexisNexis 2016) (mandating that schools include
privacy and security provisions and penalties for noncompliance in contracts with data service
providers).
222. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-109 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.222(1)(a) (West 2016);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6315 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.8(B) (2013).
223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.222(1)(a) (“An agency or institution . . . may not . . . [c]ollect,
obtain, or retain information on the political affiliation, voting history, religious affiliation, or biometric
information of a student or a parent or sibling of the student.”).
224. Ujifusa, Ramp Up Attention, supra note 115.
225. See Ryan Kline, Shedding Light on Florida’s Biometric Ban, SECUREIDNEWS (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/shedding-light-on-floridas-biometric-ban/
[https://perma.cc/5T4D-YUAS].
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state Senator Dorothy Hukill reasoned that “most people have no idea what the
use of biometric information means, and even those who do understand it
shouldn’t have the choice to participate—for now.” 226
A handful of states—Illinois, 227 Louisiana,228 Kansas,229 and Arizona 230—
have passed laws that allow biometric collection in schools, but only if a parent
or guardian consents. One such law was proposed in Missouri in January 2019
but has not made any progress. 231 Requiring guardians to give consent for
certain types of information collection is a critical approach to managing
biometrics in schools because it allows for autonomy and control over personal
information. 232 This notice-and-consent requirement also aligns with the intent
of FERPA to protect student privacy. 233
2. State Responses to Biometric Use Generally
Only three states—Illinois,234 Washington, 235 and Texas 236—have laws
that regulate the commercial use of biometric data. In Illinois, the Biometric
Information Privacy Act “covers biometric information such as thumb prints or
retinal images but also geometrical data gleaned from a person’s face.” 237 The
Texas law closely resembles Illinois’s law and also includes facial recognition,
retina scans, and voice identification. 238 Meanwhile, Washington’s law broadly
defines biometric data but excludes specific types of imaging, suggesting that
the law likely will not have a sufficient impact on the use of facial recognition
technology. 239 San Francisco, however, is considering a ban on facial recognition
226. Id.
227. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18.34(b)(1) (Westlaw through P.A. 101-115).
228. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.8(B)(2) (2013).
229. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6315 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
230. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-109 (2019).
231. See H.B. 783, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
232. Wisconsin also considered a similar law. See Asemb. B. 616, 2013 Leg. (Wis. 2014). The
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) requires commercial websites and other online
services to obtain parental consent before collecting information, including photographs and voice
recordings, from children under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (2012). COPPA
provides a decent framework for how security companies in schools should approach data collection,
but it only applies to certain types of service providers and thus does not fit squarely within the scope
of this Comment. See id.
233. See FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 114.
234. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10 to 14/15 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-115).
235. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
236. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess.).
237. Jeff John Roberts, Judge Says Customers Can Sue Over Face Scans, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/09/19/shutterfly-face-scan/ [https://perma.cc/Z5WD-F4ZH]; see 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10 (Westlaw).
238. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (Westlaw).
239. Washington Becomes the Third State with a Biometric Law, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (May
31, 2017), https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/state-legislatures/washington-becomes-thethird-state-with-a-biometric-law/ [https://perma.cc/Q5RG-GUFT].
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surveillance as well as audits of existing technologies in use, including ballistic
detection. 240 The city’s lawmakers proposed the ban due to concerns about
privacy, machine bias, and misuse by law enforcement officials that could lead
to an oppressive state. 241 These laws reflect a growing trend by states and
municipalities to address privacy concerns surrounding biometric surveillance,
which could serve as the impetus to expand protections to schools. Legislative
action in the general surveillance field should inform how school surveillance is
treated.
3. Potential for the Evolution of State Laws
For some, the appeal of advanced surveillance to reduce violence may be
sufficient to suppress any concerns about privacy or societal impact. However,
the move, albeit slow, toward bans or restrictions on collection of biometric data
suggests a shift in the way the public and state lawmakers are thinking about
these technologies. There is much left to learn about advanced surveillance
technologies, but “[a]buse doesn’t happen at the outset[, i]t happens when the
technology becomes entrenched and dismantling it becomes unimaginable.” 242
Thus, concerns need to be addressed at the beginning of the evolution, before
it is too late. One school district in Texas, which does not regulate biometrics
in schools, is already using the technology to track attendance in class and at
school-sponsored social events and to process library book check-outs. 243 In
Missouri, one school district is using biometric facial recognition cameras to
identify individuals from law enforcement criminal databases, and the system
can lock the school down when it identifies such an individual. 244
These technologies are already ingrained in society and becoming
normalized. One crucial issue is whether students in states without legal
restrictions are able to opt out of surveillance programs. It is doubtful that
students are truly given an option not to participate in school programs that
240. Gregory Barber, San Francisco Could Be First To Ban Facial Recognition Tech, WIRED (Jan. 31,
2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-could-be-first-ban-facial-recognition-tech/
[https://perma.cc/V2R7-JR3C (dark archive)].
241. Id.
242. Id.; see Miller, supra note 43 (explaining the view that parents need to be educated about what
the technologies are and how they will be used).
243. Shawna De La Rosa, Biometrics Can Make Schools Safer, but Privacy Concerns Persist, EDUC.
DIVE (May 9, 2019), https://www.educationdive.com/news/biometrics-can-make-schools-safer-butprivacy-concerns-persist/554420/ [https://perma.cc/5AB6-MLFT]; Alana Hernandez, Texas School
District Purchases Biometric Scanning Technology, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.govtech.com/products/Texas-School-District-Purchases-Biometric-ScanningTechnology.html [https://perma.cc/N2TX-57SM].
244. Chris Burt, Missouri School District Deploys Panasonic Facial Recognition for Security and Access
Control, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201904/missourischool-district-deploys-panasonic-facial-recognition-for-security-and-access-control
[https://perma.cc/5796-TFTQ]; De La Rosa, supra note 243.
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store their personal data, particularly when schools require the use of face
scanners to open doors, geolocation programs to take attendance, or
fingerprinting to pay for lunch. The development of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence moves slowly, 245 and it is unclear how the Supreme Court will
treat advanced surveillance in schools. FERPA has many vague exceptions and
loopholes, to the point that it is essentially toothless with respect to many facets
of this issue.
As the most significant and efficient movement has been on the state level,
it appears that state laws have the greatest potential for securing student privacy
in the face of the growing use of biometrics and AI in schools. In addition to
states’ abilities to act more quickly than the Supreme Court and Congress, most
regulation of K-12 schools comes at the state and local level. Thus, states are
uniquely positioned to tailor their laws to the specific needs of their schools.
States should ensure that schools are transparent with their students as to the
types of information obtained, where and how it is stored, and if there is an
option for students to opt out.
CONCLUSION
This Comment is not an argument against the implementation of
lifesaving technologies in K-12 schools; the reality is that the AI surveillance
technologies discussed in this Comment have not been proven to effectively
save lives or prevent violence in schools. Furthermore, the black boxes and lack
of intuition in AI programs, coupled with a lack of accountability by lawmakers
and the U.S. Department of Education, prevent people from knowing exactly
how these technologies are making decisions, which only increases the risk of
pernicious behavior and due process concerns. 246 The risks to the academic
environment and the long-term impacts of machine bias and privacy violations
are sufficient reasons to pause the rapid acquisition of these technologies.
Instead of emphasizing prevention and using mental health assessments and
awareness programs, these technologies only respond to a crisis that already
exists.
It is a critical time to discuss the problems, along with the excitement, that
AI brings. The information available about the impact of AI surveillance in
schools and how existing privacy laws apply to this type of surveillance is
limited; students and guardians must have the necessary information and ability
to make informed decisions. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
245. Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta
v. Greene and Davis v. United States, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237 (2011) (“The course of Fourth
Amendment law slowly develops through the process of case-by-case adjudication.”).
246. Tom Simonite, AI Experts Want To End ‘Black Box’ Algorithms in Government, WIRED (Oct.
18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-experts-want-to-end-black-box-algorithms-in-government/
[https://perma.cc/3KGB-XED6 (dark archive)].
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Americans have the right to privacy and that this right extends to schools. It
should not be so easy to compromise the societal value we have placed on
individuals’ rights.
More than anything, this must become an interdisciplinary conversation.
Engineers should continue to develop AI surveillance technology to be
maximally effective and accurate. Social scientists should research the impact of
constant surveillance and potential false signals on children and young people.
They should work together to eliminate bias in AI as well as determine the
extent to which technologies like facial recognition work on younger,
developing faces. 247 Lawyers should consider liability and keep elevating the
conversation around due process concerns. Lawmakers should become more
educated about the benefits and negative consequences of the technologies. In
addition, educators, students, and parents should be involved in these
conversations. There are already efforts to incorporate AI education into K-12
schools to ensure students have the knowledge necessary either to enter the field
themselves or at least understand their roles and opinions in a world that is
watching them.
At the very least, it is critical that the issues with AI are acknowledged.
The impact that bias can have on students could be traumatic and long lasting.
There has simply not been enough research into the potential risks of school
surveillance technologies. It is the monetization of fear—doing whatever it
takes to make people feel a little better, even if it does not work and puts
education and student well-being at risk.
We are progressively normalizing the use of these technologies. When
students go to school, they should feel safe. Nonetheless, we cannot turn the
educational environment into schools of surveillance without doing proper
reconnaissance first.
MAYA WEINSTEIN **

247. Schools should consider teaching their students software engineering and technology
development. This would diversify the field and reduce the “bias in” during software development. See
supra Section II.D.
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